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
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
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ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS





A

M I S C E L L A N Y
O F D I V E R S

Problems.

Containing ingenious Solutions
of fundry Questions,
partly Moral, partly of other
Subjects.

Translated out of *French* by *H. S.*
M. A.

L O N D O N,
ed for *J. Phillips* and *H. Rodes*,
St. Pauls Church-yard, 1680.

AG

196

F5

P43

1680



12-2-49 205
To the vertuous La-
dies, *M^{rs}* Elizabeth
Chafe, *M^{rs}* Fran-
ces Heywood, and
M^{rs} Lætitia Briggs,
the three sisters of his
dear friend Mr. H.
Some.

Vertuous Ladies,

W Hereas common and
low spirits, might
suspect this action, as a
A 2 . design

The Epistle

design to renew a past sorrow, seeing me, after a year of mourning, recall the memory of so sad a loss : I know, *your more generous souls*, will rather interpret my intent, an endeavour to allay your too long grief, when I revive the memory of a *dear dead Brother* : Since your reason, being so near of kind to his, cannot but judge it a weakness, to prefer the *passion* of an *useless sorrow*, above the merit of a *pious gratitude*.

And

Dedictory.

And yet considering ,
that others will be so par-
tial, as to blame , what-
ever their fancies do not
approve : I must forbear
to heighten the cause of
sadness, by recounting the
particulars of your loss ;
only I would fain begg
your leaves , to acquaint
the world, that in *this* they
and you are partners.
But how shall I effect
that ? since experience hath
now taught the vulgar ,
what was formerly re-
served to the knowledge
A 3 of

The Epistle

of the more prudent ;
That the commendation
of our friend is frequently
but the cloak of a self-
conceited folly : And the
world having been of
late so much abused by
hypocrisie, is now be-
come suspicious even of
vertue, if once recom-
mended ; especially by a
person, whose obscurity
leaves him lyable to their
censure. However the
love of goodness, the ob-
ligation of friendship, and
consciousness of truth, shall

Dedictory.

shall prevail with me
to the hazard of re-
pute.

I should indeed, both
betray an high folly in my
self, and injure the worth
of my Friend, should I,
considering my own dis-
ability, undertake to dis-
course at large of all his
merits, and yet thus much
I cannot but say, his in-
genuous discourse, his
modest deportment, his
humility and candour,
gained a more than or-
dinary

A 4

The Epistle

any respect from all
: ever he conversed
h, and this they shall
ness for me : They
: had the happy op-
tunity of knowing
r more thoroughly,
nd his Learning so
at, and communicat-
with that freeness; his
y so true, and pra-
ed with that inno-
ce, that they could
but love him with
viration, which also
eased in those that
a more special and
constant

Dedictory.

constant intimacy with him; for such knew him so passionate a Lover of all ingenuous Learning, that he ever counted that hour lost, which was not employed in some kind or other of it. He hated naught so much as idleness, or doing nothing, and that made his very recreations, as serious as others studies. And this gave him the advantage of being skilled in modern languages: which although he attained unto, by

The Epistle

By a sagacity proper to his disposition, and his own industry, yet his courtesie would afterwards entertain discourse with the common Tutors and professed Teachers of them upon all emergent occasions. This his true love to Learning, gave our Nation the opportunity of knowing the Nature and Constitution of the new Famous French Academy, by his translation of their History, written by Monsieur P. Pellisson, which was

Dedictory.

was a thing so acceptable to the Author, that he was pleased to write him a particular acknowledgement, and communicate to him also this present *Treatise*, which likewise at times of divertisement he taught to speak English. In the perusal of which, I doubt not but the more ingenuous will reap satisfaction, and find sufficient cause to love the *Translators* memory, if they consider that it is not offered as a part of his
more

The Epistle

more solid labours , but as
a valuable Essay of wit ,
and to be used as it was
made, only in a Diver-
sion..

That which I offer to
you, *worthy Ladies* , I give
not as a *Present* , but repay
as a *due* , which without
injustice I cannot detain ;
a greater reason , then that
which engageth me to a
publication, entituling you
to the right of Patronage :
For the memory of a dear
friendship cannot herein
challenge

Dedicatory.


challenge any thing from
me, but what the interest
of a nearer relation makes
entirely yours, and toge-
ther with it, the Devoirs
of


Your most humble

*Cambridge,
Jan. 10.
1661.*

servant,

Samuel Thoms.





TO THE READER.

Reader,



Conceive it would be rather presumption in me than humility, if before you come to read what I here present you, I should not give an account of some things that respect

To the Reader.

spect my design, and the manner of these *Problems*, which may occasion you either to bear with their faults, or to condemn them with the more reason and justice. In the first place, seeing me alledge commonly many several reasons of the *Questions* I handle, you may possibly desire to know, Whether I propound part of them to exercise my wit, and to beautifie my work, like an Oratour, that saies not only all he believes to be true, or like truth, but also all that he thinks advantagious to his cause. To this, Reader, let me tell you, that in some places indeed, the obscurity of my matter hath given me licence to make bold conjectures, and such as seem-

ed

To the Reader

ed to me more likely to add Beauty than Light to my work: But that these places are very rare, and that everywhere else I have laboured to give only solid reasons, and have alledged many of them, because having considered my matter many wayes, and at several distances, I thought they might be all true. Some indeed may here say, that it is not very likely that one and the same effect should have such different causes, for commonly when we think we have found one solid cause of an effect, this makes us despise all others, and we are apt for this reason to esteem them vain and frivolous. But, Reader, I am not of this judgement, nay on the contrary.

To the Reader.

ry do think, that when we discourse upon an effect, we should scarce ever content our selves with *one* good and true cause of it alone, because every considerable effect hath *many* causes which contribute to its grandeur, as all Rivers are formed by the uniting of several brooks, and many petty rivulets. This is very evident of its self in some kind of things, as for example, That which casts a man into a disease, cannot be alwayes one sole cause, but many causes united; so when the Question is to discourse of the ruine of a State, it is clear, that it will never be sufficient to think of finding one solid reason only, because it alwayes hath many. But
though

To the Reader.

though I see my self confined within the bounds of a Preface, which I am afraid to exceed too much : yet I will in some sort shew you, as much as the brevity which I study will suffer me, that this is no less true in regard of our *Passions*, *Actions* and *Humours*, which are the matters the greatest part of this book is composed of. First, for our Actions, and the particular and ordinary motions of our mind, I may say that all our Passions do there appear together alwayes, and act their parts there, though it be not alwayes after the same fashion : just as in each Comedy that is acted, they are the same Actors that appear upon the Stage, though they do not
there

To the Reader,

there represent the same persons. And as they say that no Element ever appears to us in its purity, that is entirely separated from others, and void of all mixtures; I conceive also that after the very same manner, not one of our ordinary Passions, which are as it were the Principles and Elements of our manners, doth ever appear in its purity, and without some mixture of the others: so that by this means it scarce ever happens, that it is only one spring which moves and actuates our spirits. It would be as long as it is easie to prove this by abundance of examples; but I shall content my self to alledge some of them. If it be demanded,

Why

To the Reader.

Why we desire glory ? It is, without question, (to give one solid reason of it) because we look upon it as a second Life, and that we think our Being is amplified and extended according as our renown spreads very far, and as we are known to many men; but for all this, if there be not another cause given, we shall not very well satisfy this demand: For it is very evident, that we desire it also, because the good opinion that others have of our excellency, fortifies and upholds the opinion which we have of it our selves. Besides, we do without doubt desire to gain Esteem, because it is a way to make us be beloved, and that

we

... of the ...

to believe - say
that for its
name there is a
... in many be-
... of the
...
... for
... We
... will
... as it
... ,
... re-
... refuse
... re-
... we
... up
... report
... we do
... him
... that
... leaves in
... here we re-
ceived

To the Reader.

ceived from him, in making him suffer as much. As we see that children think to free themselves of a kiss which one hath given them by force, in re-kissing him from whom they have received it, and say they will give it back to be rid of it themselves. Partly also, (without having any regard to the thing in its self) we revenge our selves for the opinion of others, and for fear one should come to think that we had not power or credit enough to do it : Besides this, we do it out of Fear for the future, and to the end that he which hath offended us, may not presume to do so any more; (For though this be not formally the desire of Revenge, certain it is that

To the Reader.

it alwayes contributes thereunto :) And lastly , we revenge our selves , because that , as the shaking of Fear ceases not so soon as the danger is over , so the hurt we received , hath left in us a blind impression of hatred which lasts still after that is past , and hath only its self for the reason of its self. If we should now examine the motion of the soul in *Love* , we should find in it a stranger mixture of all sorts of Causes , Natural and Moral , Corporal and Spiritual. In a word , we should as easily find that it is the same with all the other ordinary and extraordinary humours of our minds ; I mean , that there is not any of them that hath one only

only source, and that they have alwayes many roots, some whereof look backward, and some forward, some to the right hand, others to the left; nay we should find they have almost alwayes quite contrary causes, since that most commonly they come to us partly from strength and partly from weakness, partly from reason and partly from blindness; and that they almost alwayes shew both some perfection and some imperfection both at once.

Behold, Reader, the first thing I was to speak to you of, upon which I have, it may be, insisted too long. Pass we now to that which remains with all possible brevity. Some of my friends, whose least advice

(a a) weigh

To the Reader,

weighs much with me; counselled me not to forget in several places of this Book, some reasons that are commonly given upon the Questions I here handle, for fear least I seem to be ignorant of them. But I told them that this might breed in you a great dislike; and that besides, though those causes which are vulgarly given of divers Questions, are many times very good, yet are they more often superficial, or at least not the principal, and this in my opinion proceeds from hence, that the vulgar hath the common sense much better than its understanding, and that by this means it sees indeed well enough with a single eye the things that touch the common

To the Reader.

common sense, but is much less able to give the reasons of them; or discovers ordinarily only the shallowest. This I told them for mine own justification, and after they had heard me, they believed it was sufficient that I alledge these vulgar reasons, when it is altogether necessary to do so, and that I should here acquaint you, that I have slighted many others, or for fear of rendering my self tedious, I would not alledge them all.

Moreover, I have formed the most part of these *Problems* in a very concise and succinct manner; and by way of Question, in imitation of several antient Philosophers; and that I might comprehend
(43) the

To the Reader.

the more things in fewer words. But because a concise and succinct reason, which strikes the mind suddenly, seems at first to be more acute and gentle, than solid and profound, and because I know that people judge often enough of things, as of men, by their countenance and habit: I was not willing to tie my self always to this method, and have many times vented my reasons after a more Dogmatical and positive manner, and made my discourse a little more diffuse. Nevertheless, I hope that in judging the whole work in gross, you will acknowledge to me that I could not have allowed less room to these meditations which I here offer you, and that I had not a design.

To the Reader.

design to make you lose in the reading of my book any considerable part of your time, which you ought to imploy better otherwise.

These are the three things, Reader, which I desired to speak to you of; However I do not pretend, by telling you what I have endeavoured to do, to prejudice you in favour of me; I say only that I have endeavoured, and not that I have performed any thing: and on the contrary, to take from you all preoccupation, and to leave your judgement the more free, let me tell you, in putting a period to this discourse, that I myself am not satisfied, whether I have conceived my reasons with sufficient strength, whether I

(24) have

To the Reader.

have explained them with grace and clearness enough; whether my stile be hard or pleasant; and that I demand your judgement: Nay I declare unto you, that I doubt not but there are many faults in this my book; and that those that shall think so, will be of my opinion. And if still others say, that there are more faults than perfections in it, and that I have done nothing which deserves that you should read and approve it: I shall not reply any thing more harsh and sharp, then that this may very easily be, since that my spirit is so imperfect, and that I am not certain they are in the wrong.

And if you demand, what it is that hath given me the confidence to expose to your view
this

To the Reader.

this work which I present, notwithstanding the diffidence I have of my own abilities; I shall answer, that it is on the one side a certain Goodness and Complacency which some persons Illustrious for their worth, and such as I am sure you know and reverence, have had for it; and on the other side, the extream desire which I had to do somewhat that might be profitable to you; for it is certainly, Reader, this desire, more than love of glory, or any hope that I could have conceived to see any success proceed from my labours that might be advantageous to me, that hath sweetened whatsoever it could have of pains or trouble in it; and I hope, that if you make

To the Reader.

any reckoning of these Philosophical reflections, wherein I have mingled light matters with important, I may perhaps one day offer you some others upon higher subjects, from whence you may receive much more profit.



On the judicious
Translator Master
Henry Some late of
Ks. Colledge Fel-
low, my dear and
deceased Friend,

What Problems Aristotle
never told,
Nor Plutarch, nor this Oedipus
unfold,

Resolved

Resolve, who can : wherefore im-
partial Fate
Of usefull mens short life contracts
the date ?

Whence your small Pox more unre-
lenting are
Towards the High, the Learned
and the Fair ?

Why fell such loyal expectations
short
Of your so near, and so long wish'd
for Port ?

Why should a candid, studious,
peacefull mind
Scarce through this angry Age
safe passage finde ?

But stay, bold Muse ; None may
without offence

Enthorn

Fathom the Depths of State and
Providence.

Rest we content what Nature hath
reveald

To read, and leave those other
volumes seald.

Our Joy, our Sorrow with

(a) distinguish'd tears; (a) Prob.

Our (b) Laughter at this (b) 47.

Authors Bar appears;

Who doth to solid Reason recon-
cile

Every (c) almost involun- (c) 28.
tary smile.

The spring of Passions, and the
quick Debate

Of Actions seeming indelike-
rate,

Are here disclosed: his Clue does
guide your mind

Her self through her own Laby-
riths to wind.

Non

(d) 51. Now we discern, (d) Why
the parch'd ears grow white,
When your hot Constellations
unite :

We more then feel what

(e) 7. (e) streightned East-
winds blow :

(f) 39. (f) The Serick Insect we
admire and know :

(g) 12. I know too (g) Whence my
friend who did but aim
As doing well, bath hit the mark
of Fame.

Yet unresolv'd of what one Page
pretends,

(h) 6. (h) That men not best may
make your surest friends,
His life retracts that ; and against
presence

of

Of Demonstration brings full evi-
dence.

Like dispositions strong affections
move :

None worse then He, can challenge
equal love.

Jan. 2. 1661.

Christopher Ware

Master of the Free-
School of Tun-
bridge.

To

To my Worthy Friend Mr.
Samuel Thoms Pub-
lisher of this work of our
Deceased Friend the
Translator Mr. Henry
Some

Some do asperse *Translations*, say
they be
Like *reverst Arras* rugged *Ima-*
g'rie.
If so, wee'r well by this example
taught
'Tis the *Translators*, not *Translations*
fault.

SOME

SOME could out-do his author,
lend his story
A borrow'd, greater then its native
glory;
Nor like those Scriblers, as ill taught
as fed,
Who turn books not int^r other
tongues, but bread.
He knew as well to write, as to
Translate ;
To lend, as borrow learning; nor in-
grate
To forraign witts, could, as well
stockt as they,
His *Paris* bills in *Cambridge* coyn
repay.
Nay he was an *Original* of
wit
So fair, so worthy, *Heaven* *Transla-*
ted it.

But can I name our loss, nor pay his
Herse
The tributary duty of a Verse?

A duty;

A duty, though superfluous, since
he
Was to himself sufficient Elc-
gie.

Should we his *Learning, Vertue, Can-*
did scan,

Those joynt *Perfections* speak him
more then *Man*.

Dear Sir ! when I recall those Attick
nights

We once enjoy'd with him, those lost
delights ;

When his discourse charmd our at-
tentive ears,

And swell'd us then with joy, as now
with tears,

When we could call his learn'd di-
versions ours,

With which he us'd to wing the
flow-pac'd hours ;

Methinks stern grief doth all my
sence engross,

And the remembrance duplicates our
loss.

But

But Sir 'tis you alone must now re-
trieve

This loss, and in his writings make
him live.

Then as (while he lyes low in silent
earth)

You've given this *Posthume* off-spring
happy birth;

So still, *Lucina* like, propitious
be,

And 's other labours from abortion
free.

Raise him a monument lasting as
Fame,

And let as *Trophies* of his living
Name,

His learned reliques, while his ashes
burn,

Rise like the *Phenix* from their *Par-
rents Urne*.


Then when his happy labours shall
be grown

Old in esteem, enrich us with your
own.

So shall your name with his enrolled
stand,
And both in Honours train walk
hand in hand.

*R. S. Late Fellow of
Kings Colledge.*

Upon



Upon the untimely death of his
most Ingenious and Learned
Friend Mr. *Henry Some*, the
Translator of this Book.

*S*urely in Nature, there's some rea-
son, Why
The best of Spirits do the soonest Dy.
Brisk wits, it seems, are like the purest
fire,
Which brightest burns, but soonest does
expire.
The overleaven'd Port of men, we see
Aged and loathed like the Raven bee :
Whilst the more sprightly part, like
fragrant Rose
Lov'd and long-liv'd in death their
eyelids close :
The Learned Planet courtier to the
Sun, (run :
As swift as Post his stated race doth
Whilst

Whilst his dull brother, with his leaden
face,
Ends not his course, in twice ten times
the space :
Ah me ! it grieves me, that the ripest
wit,
Should fatal prove, to him that own-
eth it ;
This kild my Friend : from henceforth
be't a shame
To be long-liv'd, for years your wit
will blame.

J. Jones fellow of the
Kings Colledge in
Cambridge.



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PROB. I.

*What's the reason that the address
and subtilty of wit. which appears
in the execution of an evil action,
makes us think it sometimes more
ugly, and sometimes less?*



His Question having
two parts, doth not
the reason of the
first consist in this,
that he which is in-
genious and imployes

his wit to do ill, seems to be more
ungratefull towards God, in abusing
the gifts which he hath received of
him? Or else is it, that he which
B hath

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ith cunningly carried on a very
malicious action, seems not to have
been touched with any remorse of
conscience that troubled his judge-
ment, for which reason he is accounted
more wicked and more unnatural?
Or else, is it that an evil action full
of wit and address, cannot have been
committed by a sudden and pardon-
able motion; and that this address
which appears in it, shews that a
man hath digested it at his leisure,
that he had a long time had it in his
mind, and that he executed it with
a full and constant will? Or else, is
it because he that sins so craftily
seems to have been very violently
desirous to sin, since it is certain that
a violent desire whets the wit, and
renders it fruitful in inventions.
Or else, is it because the more in-
genious a man is, the more close
and secret about it is, so that there
requisite the more impudence and
simulation to execute it? Or
lastly, is it because the rendering

deceitful by a very refined treason, the common assurances which we take of things, is an undermining the foundations of publick repose, and after a particular manner, the shaking of nature, which hath not given us any better means to guide our selves in civil society, and an instructing of knaves new wayes to hurt honest men, so that this is a being doubly guilty; as a thief is doubly guilty, if not content to steal the fruits of a garden, he enters into it by some place formerly inaccessible, and makes a new way for those that shall have a mind to imitate him? But if this be so, whence comes it then, that at other times the ingenuity that shines in the execution of an ill action, makes us blame it less sharply, and sweetens the hatred it ought to beget in us? Is it in this case not so odious, because the lustre of wit may in some sort repair the defect of it? Or else, because when experience teacheth

us, that the *beauty* of the mind, and a *black malice* seldome lodge together, and do not willingly associate; we do then frame some excuseable motives to an evil action, when we see some gentleness shine in it, and conceive that he that did it, was forced to it, either out of *Gallantry*, or by the strength of some sudden *Passion*, rather than out of an extream *Malice* and *ill-nature*?

P R O B. 2.

Whence comes the custome of making fire works, and shooting off guns, either when a peace is made, or after a victory, or at the entrance of Princes into some City, or upon other the like occasions?

First, as to publick rejoycings; Is it because joy which is a violent dilatation of our spirits, cannot be better expressed, then by shews

which consist only in violent dilations of powder by fire? Or else, if there be no likelihood that men did so nicely regard such a relation, and that mans imagination out of a secret impulse, took up a thing that resembles the motion of joy to express it by? Is it rather because *Light*, which all these Artificial fires redouble, is naturally the Emblem of *Joy*, and does naturally delight the imagination more than any thing? And therefore we call *sadness* a *dark* cloudy humor, and when we speak of it, we say that it overspreads the mind as 'twere with a *cloud*. Or else, is it not because we finding that our *own* voice is too weak to represent our joy, and that it is wholly unequal to the greatness of our contentment, we borrow the mouth of Cannons, and the noyses of powder to express it, and to carry the news of it speedily on every side, and make it as it were even mount up to heaven? It is manifest that *Joy* of all

the Passions is that which desires most to be known and published, and a joyfull man is equally ravished that his friends, and enemies know that he is so. Or else, as it is a pleasure to see the picture of some great Dragon, which had frightened us, after that we have no more cause to fear it; is it not also delightful for the same reason to see the vain images of troubles, violences, and passed wars in the fires of joy after that a peace is begun? Or else may we take it thus, that as it is a sign a man hath fast bound a savage beast, when he can play with it without harm, and without dread, and make a pass-time of its rage and fury; so it is a sign that one hath fast chained up that cruel monster, War, when one can freely sport with the most terrible instruments of its fury, when one can make them vomit up, whatever they have most hurtful and affrighting, without any mans receiving either fear or hurt thereby; and that one
makes

makes them serve for a divertissement to Women and Children? Or else is not this *secondary* and innocent use which we make, of them as it were a testimony that we abolish the *first*; and therefore also when we would speak of a profound peace, we use to say that all the instruments of War shall become instruments of Husbandry, or shall be employed to other uses?

Now seeing that fireworks and the reports of the Canon are used to represent a publick joy, is it not for the same reason that they are used at the entrance of Princes into some City, as it were to testify to them that their arrival is esteemed a publick happiness? Or else was it not first instituted on this manner, out of an extream flattery, as if they meant to say, that they judged the soul of the Prince that is thus received, so *Martial*, that they thought they could not better please him, than by shows that represent War?

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If any one, notwithstanding all this, shall wonder, that to *receive* a Prince, we do to him in like manner as we would do if we desired to *drive* him *away*, and that we express our *kindness* by the most proper marks of *hatred* and *hostility*: is it not on the contrary, partly for that the imagination of men is carried to it, because naturally a violent *love* borrows the characters of *hate*? Therefore we see that beasts when they make much of their little ones, they strike them little blows, and toss them up gently into the air; and that mothers caressing their children with all tenderness, give them little *pats* and call them *rogues*: and that the best friends delight to quarrel with one another seemingly and in jest: and we might questionless prove the same by *wanton love*, chose we not rather to pass by this proof, then to write any thing that should defile this paper. And if yet you demand of me, why a violent *love* borrows

borrow the characters of *hatred*; Is it not out of a too great desire of flying the appearances of flattery, and false amity, that it runs into this contrary extream, which is more irrational; as if flying from an enemy, a man should cast himself down a precipice? Or rather that in this there is nothing done otherwise than ought to be, but that extream *love* hath some characters like to the violence of *hatred*, because generally all extreams resemble one another?

PROB. 3.

Whence is it that the *Choler* of him that hath no cause to be afraid of us, and hath our necks under his feet, is sometimes sooner appeased by *bravado's*, and boldness, than by *humility* and *entreaties*?

IS it not for the reason that *Montaigne* gives of it; namely that
 B 5 generous

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ous persons suffer themselves
r to be overcome by the
rosity and greatness of the
age of him whom fortune hath
low, than at his cries and
ns, because they are more ready
verence the image of virtue,
simply to be bent by compas-
which many times may be
asonable? Or else, is it from
other causes, as for instance
that it is a thing that astonishes
surprizes him who can do what
ease with us, to see that instead
submitting to him, we brave him,
that every astonishment is as
re an arrest and surprisal of the
t, which consequently interrupts
motion of Choler, and gives the
that is surprized with it, time to
etter advised? To this might be
ed, perhaps, that in Choler the
many times moves not, but by
violence of the first swing that is
n it; and that in this case if one
stop it, it is infallibly extinct; as
one.

one deads the motion of a body which is moved only by the violence of an impression it receives, if one stop it but one sole moment. Or else, is it because the bravado's and boldness of those whom an extream misfortune hath cast down, doth not shew so much *Constancy* and *Resolution*, although at the first sight it seems to do so; as on the quite contrary *Despair*, because he that *hopes* nothing, doth likewise *fear* nothing; so that instead of raising *Choler* it excites *Pitty*? Or else may we venture to say, that naturally every thing is extinguished by the same causes which made it live, when they are too abundant; and that as *Love* is extinguished by too free and too wanton caresses, and *Fire* by too great an abundance of wood cast on it, it may fall out sometimes after the very same manner, that the extremity and utmost excess of injuries *appeases* *Choler* instead of *provoking* it? Or else, is it not because the reproaches.

proaches, and bravado's of those that see themselves to be in our power, are a testimony of their *freedom*, and that we believe they have no worse thoughts than those that they dare thus express with so much liberty, whereas, if they beg of us with submission and humility, we suspect them of *hypocrisie*, and fear least this dissimulation covers some black revenge, and an implacable and furious hatred against us? Or else, is it that for a man to humble himself before us, is to furnish us with a subject of only *Vulgar* clemency, which as it is less fair, so it doth with less violence attract us; and that, on the contrary, to brave us, after having offended us, is to furnish us with matter for an *heroick* clemency, which is more beauteous in its self, and followed with more of glory? Or lastly, is it that he which doth freely reproach us, and boldly declares our injustice, cutting our soul to the very quick by this violence

lence of his discourse, doth awaken it, makes it come to its self, forces it to be attentive to the reasons he alledges, and makes it comprehend them better, after which, though its interest oblige it to a greater revenge then before, it cannot still continue its rage, because, as *Aristotle* saith very well, *a man is never angry unjustly*, that is to say, against that which he doth very clearly know to be reasonable.

P R O B. 4.

Whence comes it that Tears are a comfort to sadness, and how are they formed?

IS it not that Tears do not properly unload the *heart*, as it is commonly said, but the *brain*, which being more dry after it is delivered of those humidities, serves the soul better, and is the cause that he which

is afflicted having his reason more clear and strong, sees better the just grounds he hath to comfort himself? Certainly it is probable enough that the *brain* becomes more free, and the spirit more *serene* after this *storme* of *tears*, as we see the *air* is never more serene than after *rain*; and the example of children teaches us that the moistness of the brain accompanies the weakness of reason. Or is it moreover that by weeping we discharge part of the pituitous humour, or of the melancholy humour, both which cast the spirits into pensiveness, and a dull heaviness or stupidity? Truly this second reason seems not to be void of likelihood no more than the first. But (will some one say) whence proceed Tears, and what is their fountain? Certainly it is no easie question to answer; and perhaps, to resolve it exactly, would require a longer search then can be allowed a Problem. But yet methinks one might venture

venture to say according to the appearances we see, that our inward parts compressing themselves in sadness, as it is the property of compression, there issues from them some moisture by this compression, as from a sponge squeezed : Or else that the brain continuing cold in sadness by reason of the spirits flying to the heart, it yeilds through its coldness some thin substance which becoming heavy, seeks its way out ; Or else, as sadness generally weakens whatever is in us, that retentive faculty of him that is sad, is not strong enough to keep back, as it did before, those humidities, which we call Tears, but suffers them to run out when it relaxeth its self.

P R O B. 5.

What is the reason there are Tears of joy?

IS it that a too violent *good* wounds us many times as well as too strong a *light*? Or else that every change of condition in which one hath long continued, how happy and advantageous soever it be, hath alwayes something of incommodious in it? Or else, that there is some bitterness, and as it were an infusion of wormwood in the greatest part of the sweets of this life? Or else, is there not some natural reason in it? and may we not say that joy excessively dilating our inward parts, doth by this means drive out some humidity; because that which is dilated cannot contain it self in the same bounds where it was before? Or else, is it not that in an affliction.

affliction, we are hindred from weeping, out of a fear for the future, which makes us imploy all our thoughts in consideration of means that may deliver us from that which we fear; so that after we are become more happy, we do yet many times nevertheless cry, to satisfie that desire which we had to do so? Or else, is it not credible, that we never understood our misery better, then when being delivered from it, we can compare the image of it, which is still very fresh in our memory, with a quite contrary condition: so that it is not to be wondred at, if many times this comparison which discovers to us the greatness of it, makes us weep even in the midst of our joy, through a kind of pittie we have of our selves? Or else shall I take it thus, that in the sudden motions of a great joy, the dilatation of the spirits of the heart is so great, that it is weakned thereby, and that our

soul.

soul finding its own weakness, by this means is apt to be wounded by every reflexion that hath never so little of trouble in it? Or lastly, do not these tears of joy proceed from hence, that learning all on a sudden, that we are delivered from some great evil, under which we have lain a long time, the news cannot presently gain an entire belief in us: and that as a body that is frozen, doth not lose its coldness at that very instant it is brought to the fire; by the same reason our soul cannot lose that impression of its passed sadness, at the very same instant that the good it was deprived of becomes present to it? See then the causes which it seems may be given of that marvellous state of man, wherein he weeps although he have a serene spirit, by an accident which we see sometimes happen in the air when it rains and shines both at once. There are are also Tears which abundant laughter brings
into

into our eyes; but they are not of the same *Species* with those I spake of but now; and I conceive, they proceed only from that great and violent agitation which laughter causes within us; for there is no passion which shakes a man all over with greater violence; and it may very well be, that a motion so violent forces out of the eyes some humidity; as we see that the violent agitation of a vessel wherein there is some liquor, makes some drops of it sparkle out; and as the wind that shakes the trees after a rain, makes those drops which lay there, fall to the ground.

P R O B. 6.

Whence comes it that many very wicked men, are oftentimes the best friends?

IT is found by experience, that very bad men are often most zealous friends to them that they bear an affection to, nay sometimes more than the best of men. To enquire then the causes of this effect, is it not that there is a kind of amity which is not begotten by *reason*, but by a means more low, namely long *acquaintance* and *familiarity*: so that souls of the lowest rank and that have the least of reason, are not incapable of it: but on the contrary are in some sort more capable than others, because not governing themselves by judgement, they do only follow the impressions of other things; amongst which, that which
length

length of time and use makes, is none of the least? Or else, is it not because good men are friends only *ad aras*, that is, as far as will stand with Religion, and wicked men beyond? So that if they must only prostitute their consciences to their friends, and tread underfoot all things sacred, and despoile themselves of the fairest ornaments the soul can be adorned with, they do it very willingly. Or else, is it not that as *dogs* are faithful to us, and succour us against those that set upon us, partly indeed out of *love*, but partly also because it is their *disposition* to be easily provoked: so wicked men help us with great ardour against our enemies, and combat them with great animosity, not only for the affection they bear us, but partly also, for that by reason of their *natural curstness* and *venome*, of which they are full, they are more apt to be inflamed with a violent choler? Or else, is it because it is very natural for us to love

love with violence something without us; wicked men that love neither *God*, nor *Justice*, nor *common goodness*, are constrained by the force of nature to love infinitely some particular persons? Or else, is it that cultivating only that part of their duty which consists only in *friendship*, and keeping that only as a remainder of the beauty of the soul, which hinders them from altogether resembling savage beasts, they have the more love for that, as a mother hath the more love for her son, if he be her only one? Or lastly, is it not that the nature of things is such, that generally in every extream there is some light mixture of the contrary extream: For instance, we see by experience that in cold Countries there are sometimes in summer more violent heats then those of the hot Countries; and on the contrary, the subtilty of the air of the hot Countries is the reason that sometimes the cold there is more pene-

trating than that of the cold Countries. The *Germans* that pass for the least subtle people of *Europe*, have more of subtilty than any of the rest in all sort of *mechanick inventions*. The most ingenious people are commonly the most awkward and unapt in some slight things. *Melancholy* persons are subject to more violent joyes, then those that are *sanguine*; *covetous* people, according to the vulgar opinion, are sometimes carried out to a greater excess of prodigality then *prodigals*. Men extraordinary valiant do often tremble more then others at the sight of a great danger. *Women*, whose visage is more properly then that of men the *seat of Beauty*, are also more susceptible then men of an extream and ~~horrid~~ *ugliness*. Lastly, to return to the mixture of goodness and wickedness, one of the cruellest Emperours of *Rome* could not, as the Historian saith, be present at

the acting of a *Tragedy*, but those feigned miseries which he there heard, raised a compassion in him which made him weep. We read as much of another Tyrant of *Greece* of the same nature ; and when a man is arrived at the highest degree of wickedness, the last crime he commits, is to be his own murderer, and voluntarily to throw himself into everlasting pains, by the violence of the remorse of his conscience. In which there seems to be a certain air and shadow of magnanimity and heroick goodness.

P R O B.

P R O B. 7.

What is the reason that the Wind which comes in at a window or a little hole, is more dangerous than that which we feel abroad in the open field?

UPon this Problem some may possibly think, that as the water meeting with a very narrow channel, becomes more rapid; so the wind that comes in at a door, or a window, or a small chink, for the same reason redoubles its violence: Which is very true, but nothing to the purpose, for the clearing the difficulty of this Question: because it is certain that a very little wind gliding in at a cranny, is more apt to hurt one, than another wind much more violent, when one is in the open field. This cause then being thus rejected, is it not rather because
C the

The wind which we suffer in the open field doth presently close the pores through its coldness, and so arms us against it self: whereas the wind that comes into the house by some little hole, finds us hot all the time, and consequently doth, as long as it continues blowing, find our flesh soft, and easily penetrable. Or else, is it because the wind that cools only one part of us, such as that is which comes in at a little crack, makes the spirits, to which this coldness is an enemy, fly to the other parts, which is hurtful to this? Or else, in plain terms, as the welfare of a Commonwealth consists in a certain proportion of the *Citizens* one to another: so the good state of the *body* is a certain equal temper of all the *parts*: so that when any thing breaks this equality and harmony, and cools one part, while the rest continue warm this is in it self a malady, and it were better they had been all equally cooled? Or else, is it because the

wind that one suffers in the open field, is a very *wide*, and as it were *broad* motion of the air, which arriving at us, must needs break it self against our body, as it were a *wave*, and pass on each side without penetrating it: Whereas the wind of a little hole, being *sharp*, doth the better *penetrate* our pores, and doth us the more mischief: as we see that an *arrow* which does not hurt us if it be cast at us *broadwise*, wounds and pierces us if it hits us with the *point*? Or lastly, doth not that which *Plutarch* saies, contribute to the same effect, *viz.* that the wind of a little hole, hurts us the more, because we take no heed of it, and that so we suffer it a great while before we put ourselves in a condition to avoid it?

P R O B. 8.

What is the reason that Evil is more active than Good ?

IT is a very strange thing, and yet very true, that *Evil* is more active than *Good*. *Grief*, which is an evil, is more active than *pleasure*, and surmounts it so much in violence, that although a man be at the same time tickled with all the pleasures that can flatter the senses, a small *Grief* will be able to spoil all his happiness. As *Grief* is stronger than *Pleasure*, so *Fear*, which is a production of *Evil*, is a passion much more violent than *Hope*, which is a production of *Good*. *Bad examples* have more force to debase our minds, then *good* have to raise them up. *Poysons* are stronger than *Remedies*; and whereas there is not any remedy that can cure us of our ma-
ladies

ladies, unless it be applyed to us, there are poysons so violent, that they kill us with the very smell of them, if they do but come nigh our nostrils. Things that are the sweetest to the taste, as *Honey* and *Sugar*, are not yet so sweet, as *Wormwood* is bitter : and if you mingle an equal quantity of them together, the result will be bitter and not sweet, the ill savour prevailing over the good. Lastly, to omit nothing upon this subject, and to run through all kind of things by which this truth may be cleared, although amongst colours ~~white~~ be naturally more excellent than *Black*, as more approaching to the nature of Light : So it is, as Painters have observed, that it is the most feeble of all ; and that, if one mixeth it in an equal quantity with *black*, it is alwayes vanquishd. But what then is the cause of a thing that seems so contrary to reason ? I answer, that there can be no other given of it, but this, that Good

here *below*, is not in its fountain, and that we see only some weak raies and small sparks of it ; for if it were at *home* in its fountain , it would infallibly conquer Evil, and would be too strong for it, since that *Activity* being a *Good*, it is impossible but that it should be a property and dependence of *Good* rather than of *Evil*. But as of two Kings, he that is the strongest may be vanquished by the other, in a place where he hath not the body of his forces, and his greatest power : So it may very well be that *Good* may be more active than *Ill*, and yet that it may be vanquished by it in *this* world where we are, and, as I may so say, in this *lower region* of things, where it is not in its fountain , and in its greatest glory , and from hence may be drawn a very strong consideration to demonstrate *the existence of God*, as I could shew more at large, and more clearly, if it were here my design.

P R O B. 9.

What is the reason that Water-drinkers are greater lovers of fruit than others?

IS it not because water hath a certain faint quality that offends the stomach, and the juice of fruit corrects that quality, and is to them as a kind of wine which they are not averse from? Or else, doth not the same reason that makes them love water, make them also love fruit, to wit, because they love all things that are moist and cooling, and that fruit as well as water is in the number of things that are most so? Or else, is it not because they which drink water only, do with more difficulty digest, and for this reason they love things that are easily digested, such as are most fruits, and prefer them before viands that give more pain to

the natural heat? And if any demand, Whence it is that they say also, that on the contrary those which are great lovers of wine, do not care at all for fruit: Is it not the contrary to those reasons I now mentioned? Or else, do they not hate fruit, because by their moisture, they dull and deaden the palate, and so render it less sensible of the pleasure to which they are so much addicted? Or doth not the same reason for which they love salt and drying meats, make them also hate those that quench the thirst, amongst which it seems fruit holds the first rank?

P R O B.

PROB. 10.

What is the reason there is no such enmity as that which succeeds amity?

IS it not because our mind doth ardently affect all *new* things, and loves *change*; and that when we come to hate him, whom we have a long time loved, it is a very great *novelty* and an *extream change*, which consequently hath some particular allurements to attract our minds and engage it more violently in its design? Or else, do not great friendships leave behind them great enmities, because they could not have been destroyed but by great quarrels, and great subjects of hatred and discontent? Or else, is it because as a *stranger*, whom we do not know, cannot be either hated or loved: by the same reason, he that is

very well known, may be hated more, and loved more than another ; and that there are none so well known to us, as those whom a long friendship hath made us familiarly acquainted with. And indeed as the great knowledge we have of them makes us more lively imagine the motions of hatred they bear us, the words they will say, the thoughts they will have, and their very gestures in their anger, it is credible that this serves to inflame our wrath. Or else perhaps we may say that those, that are great lovers of one another, do only seem to hate more then other men ; and perhaps they seem so, because that some relicks of friendship, which they cannot chase out of their mind, rendering the injuries which they mutually do one another, more grievous, makes them complain thereof with words fuller of passion, and talk of it uncessantly. Indeed it is unquestionless much more grievous to be wronged by him that one loves, then
by

by him that one hates ; because this kind of wrong raises as it were a *Civil war* in our passions , exciting one part of our heart against the other , and hinders us not only from obtaining what we desire , but also from desiring it compleatly and without repugnance of a piece of our selves ; and *Lovers* may be good testimonies of this truth ; for it is certain , as there are many waters that do not offend the *sound* parts of our bodies , but yet when they touch a *sore* place , cause there incredible pain : So this sweet wounding of their heart , makes them most sensible of injuries , which , without that , would not vex , nor move them at all . Or , lastly , those that loved very dearly , do combat one another with the cruellest acts of enmity , to learn , as I may so say , to hate one another , and to confirm themselves in that bitterness and violence , into which they are fain , because they find , that all sorts of habits are fortified

fortified by exercise, and by the acts which they produce.

P R O B. II.

Why hath extream affliction no tears?

DOth it not proceed from hence, for that the soul in an extream affliction, hath no *lively* apprehensions, such as those must be that raise tears, but falls into a kind of *stupidity* and *insensibleness*? Or is it not because when we are extreamly afflicted, Nature, which finds that the greatness of our Affliction would make us shed too many tears, and that so great an evacuation might excessively weaken, instead of comforting us, keeps them back altogether, and resists the motion of our disordered minds, which, were it not for that, would abuse this sovereign remedy, and employ it to our own ruine? Or else, may we not
upon

upon this subject say, that he that is mightily afflicted, cannot weep as he would do, because generally every excessive passion hinders it self from arriving at its end, and becomes an obstacle to its self; and that for this reason those that are oppressed with too much *Fear*, desiring to flee, find that it hath nailed their feet to the ground; and that their hand shakes that are too much in *Choler*, and that they cannot express but by inconsequent and disjoynted words, the greatness of their passion, no more then those whom a too great *Love* possesses, or those who are in a too great excess of *Joy*? Certainly it seems that this is not void of likelihood. And if it be asked, Why every excessive passion fails of arriving at its end? it may be answered, that this happens to it, because it is a malady of the soul, and a defect; and that the qualities proper to a malady are, impotence, weakness and ill success. Or else, every
in-

inordinate passion is an obstacle to its self, and is impotent, because it desires things *vast* and *infinite*, and beyond all *possibility*, which hinders our soul from executing those that are *real* and *possible*. For we see evidently, that he which is moved with a very great *Choler*, cannot express, at least in common and ordinary words, his resentment, and the indignity which raised it, because he seeks the most strong, and desires to use a more eager expression then the language of man is capable of. It is plain also, that *Lovers* do many times *hack* and *hammer* instead of *speaking*, for the same reason, namely because they would invent terms that should be as it were all *flame*, and have more *force* and *energie* then they can have; and that a like desire is the cause also why *Joy*, which is so *talkative*, becomes *mute* in being increased too much, or brings forth only sighs and inarticulate and confused sounds. And as for excessive
Fear,

Fear, though this be a passion to which one cannot so easily apply this reason; yet one may say possibly, that he which is too lively possess'd by the image of a terrible and present danger, hinders himself, that in this perturbation and trouble wherein he is, he desires not simply to run, but to use some means more prompt and efficacious then natural and ordinary ones by which a man runs away; and that his imagination thus overslipping whatsoever is real and possible, as that of others which we spake of but now, does not, by reason hereof, put in practice those faculties that move the parts of his body; for it is evident that it is the operation of the *Fancy* that must put in practice those faculties. But however it be, it is very likely that *Anger*, *Joy*, and *Love*, fail of expressing themselves well, for this reason; and if it be so, we may with likelihood say, that even so he which is very much afflicted, cannot weep, because

because that his soul disdaining the common characters of sadness, searches in that ardour wherein it is, so great ones that they are impossible. Or else, we may say that it doth not search for such, but as that antient Painter, that chose rather to cover with a veil the face of *Agamemnon*, then venture to represent his grief: it also chuseth rather to refrain tears, and words, and not to paint forth the greatness of its affliction, then to be forced to paint it by the same things which the smallest of afflictions make use of. If any one be not satisfied with all these reasons, it may yet possibly be added, that, as we said before, a moderate compressing of the inward parts, may squeeze forth the humidity of tears; and a too violent compression of the same parts may, on the contrary, keep them in, by closing up the passages by which they use to come to the eyes.

P R O B. 12.

What is the reason some things are gotten best by neglecting them?

WE said in the fore-going Problem, that a Passion being wrought to a very high pitch, is an obstacle to its self, and hinders us from arriving at what we aim at. Now we will endeavour to give a reason of a difficulty like to that, but yet greater, *viz.* Why there are many things which are best acquired by neglecting them, and looking another way. Thus for example, the Philosophers have observed to us, that *Glory* is of such a nature, that the best means to get it, is to run away from it, and not to desire it, and that she favours those most, that do least regard her. *Pleasure*, if we consider it well, is like to it in this: for the soul being softened through
the

the love of pleasure, and rest, becomes so sensible of incommodities and griefs, so vulnerable by all sorts of crosses, and so feeble, that the least thing wounds it mortally, and makes it despair; and even the smallest misfortunes become great unto it : On the contrary, the contempt of pleasure gives it presently a more strong constitution, by which it sustains the shock of evils that would disturb her rest and her pleasures, and by taking away her delicacy, makes her not to stand in need of *extream* pleasures to be delighted, but to be satisfied if she have *common* ones. In *Eloquence* and *Conversation*, there are also many *Graces* which are not gotten if one *affects* to have them; and must, as I may so say, *escape* from us without our knowledge, to be *natural and charming*. But I need not enlarge here into any large discourse, to prove this verity by many examples, seeing we meet with it at every turn in the things of
our

our life, and that even the vulgar confess it and alledge it very often, though they are ignorant of the cause of it. But it consists in this, that *all those things that are best gotten by neglecting them, are vanities*; for our soul weakens it self by the desire of vanities; but on the contrary she fortifies her self, and gets more light and solidity, when she with-draws her affection from them, and by these new forces, which by this means she acquires, she obtains afterwards not only greater advantages, but also even those slight ones which she contemned; for these slight and vain good things are commonly appendixes to solid ones, and follow them as images and shadows follow bodies.

PROB. 13.

What is the reason that those things to which we are accustomed, are not prejudicial to our health?

THere is nothing more common then that saying, that things which we are accustomed to, are not prejudicial to our health; and there is commonly a reason given of it, with which men are satisfied, *viz. that Custom is a second Nature.* But certainly I conceive, that he which will a little cast the eye of his mind upon this answer, and consider it at his leisure, will see it vanish. For *Custom* hath indeed some power upon our inclinations, and on the things which depend on the *soul*: but I do not see that it hath the same power in natural changes, and things that depend purely of the *body*. To understand it clearly, Suppose that a
man

man should a hundred times hold some Combustible body very near the fire, you will see plainly that it will never accustom it self to endure the power of it, without receiving harm; nay, on the contrary, it will consume by little and little: Even so, if moisture be contrary to the welfare of a body, it is very manifest that it will never accustom it self so well to be moistened, but it will still receive damage from the wet. Since then this answer is not satisfactory, should we not rather say, that there cannot be rendered any universal reason of it, but that it happens oftentimes for several particular reasons, which have nothing of common, that many things cease to hurt after that one hath been accustomed to them? As for example, Cold doth not hurt him that is used to endure it, because it shuts up the pores and thickens the skin; and that he that hath a thick skin, and his pores closed, must needs be more difficultly

is hurt by external qualities. On the contrary, he that is used to walk bare-headed in the field, receives no hurt from the heat of the Sun, as may be seen in the *Bohemians* children, and in the Peasants of some part of *France*, by reason that this very heat hath sucked by little and little from their brains, all those humidities which might have bred Rheumes or Catarrhs. *Violent labour* also doth not hurt those that are used to it, for that it dries the Nerves, and the Nerves cannot be dried, but they are hardened, nor hardened without becoming stronger, and fitter either to bear a great weight, or to thrust a thing with vehemency. Or else, is there in it some gross mistake? and should we not rather say, that things which we are used to, do not cease to hurt, because they have lost the power to do it, through use: but that when a man hath long used a thing, without falling into any remarkable inconveni-

ence, it is a sign it was not contrary to him at the first, although it seemed to be so : and therefore Physicians do very wisely permit him to use it for the future. Or else (if we must however find out some reason common to all the effects which this Problem comprehends) doth it not consist in this, that as oftentimes *Good* is in the *middle*, and *Evil* in the *extreams* ; so also on the contrary that sometimes *Evil* is only in the *mean*, and *Good* in the *extreams*, so that an hurtful thing having by length of time brought our temper into some extream, it may by this means deliver us from the evil which it brought upon us. But that *Evil* is sometimes in the *middle*, and *Good* in the *extreams*, there are that prove it by several reasons : For they say that the *higher* and the *lower* regions of the air are more calm then the *middle* region, in which storms and tempests are formed ; that the *extream* force or
extream

extream *weakness*, of the Suns rayes do equally render the air serene: but that when they have only a moderate force, they *raise* vapours which they cannot *scatter*: That man should either not reason at all, but follow plain common sense, as the Peasants do, or else reason *exactly* and *profoundly*, and become truly learned; because reasoning by halves, and being learned by halves, is the way to embroyl ones self in a thousand doubts that others know not; that Angels and things inanimate are equally incapable of misery; but that those natures that are in the middle between these two extreams, are only subject unto it. Though these examples be taken from things far remote from the matter in hand, yet they may bring us to a belief that it is many times after the same manner in things which belong to the health of our bodies.

P R O B. 14.

Whence comes it, that (as it is the saying of some body) a great service is not so proper to gain our affection, as many petty services done in a continued series and on all occasions?

IS it not because a great service may be received in an instant, whereas this train of petty services takes up in the gaining of our heart, a great deal of time, which must needs help forward the business mightily with all sorts of causes? Or else is it that when any ones beneficence descends upon us thus by little and little, and as it were drop by drop, we do at the several times we receive it, make more several reflections upon the obligation which he layes upon us, so that thus his benefits do sink the better to our hearts, like herein

to a *gentle* and *soft* rain falling by little and little, which penetrates better into the earth, whereas great and *violent* *showers* only sweep it and run away without soaking in? Or else, is it that this continued train of petty *devoires* and services, each of which apart is not of any consideration, leads us to amity and good liking by so sweet and gentle a force, and brings us on so insensibly, that we perceive it not, and so make no resistance? Or else, as we love more those meats which having delighted the *palate* do not lie heavy upon our *stomacks*; do we not in some sort love more for the same reason the services that do us good, and yet leave no weight of necessary and forced *obligation* upon our *spirits*; as questionless petty services often reiterated do, because that on one side their number supplies their weakness, and makes them counterwaile a great benefit all at once; and that on the other side they are of such

'such a nature, that he which did them cannot handsomely reproach them to us? Whence it comes that the acknowledgement we preserve of them in our minds, seems to us to be the more voluntary. Or else that which we search for, proceeds it not hence, that he which doth us a great good turn, is believed by us to do it out of vanity, to gain the reputation of generousness or bounty, because a great service makes a noise, and is exposed to view; but that we cannot suspect the same of him who is assiduous to render us a thousand petty devoirs, which appear not to the eyes of others, and are perceived only by our selves? Or else shall we say, that one may do us a great service in our absence, but that this train of petty services presupposes that he that would make himself be beloved, is not absent from him by whom he desires to be beloved: but that on the contrary, he converses ordinarily

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him ; and that this familiarity
at which aids him principally to
mate himself into our heart ? Or
; doth not this also contribute
that when we have received
notable benefit from another ,
is a thing commonly known, it
sens many times , that those
se interest it is to make us forget
ve so much artifice to extenuate
o give it ill interpretations, and
ke away its lustre and weight,
they seduce us, and extinguish
as the resentment which we
ld have had of it; whereas when
one hath insinuated himself into
favour, and hath witnessed to us
ardour of his affections in many
arrences, by petty services which
e not been observed by others,
resentment which we have
eof is not exposed to the assaults
is enemies, or rivals ; and he is so
ch the more assured, the more it
ecret and the cause of it not
own?

P R O B. 15.

What is the reason that a great joy makes us facile to pardon injuries?

IT is certain that a great joy disposes us extreamly to clemency, that it *softens* our hearts, and expells that *hardness* and *bitterness* which injuries have caused in them, and makes us easie to pardon them; and as it is a thing certain, and such whereof the enquiry cannot be otherwise than curious, pleasant, and profitable; I conceive I have reason to allow it a place amongst these *Problems*, and endeavour to discover all the causes of it. In the first place then, I believe I shall speak a very great truth, if I say, that our soul being surprized on a sudden by a great happiness, finds it self secretly obliged to some *sovereign* power, and hath secret motions of *gratitude*

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towards

towards it ; and that finding its self unable to do it any good whereby to testifie its thanks, it is so much the more constrained to do good to his *works*, that is to say, that it becomes good, and disposed to do good, even to those that have wronged it. But besides this reason, which without doubt contributes very much to the effect we speak of, I conceive that *Joy* doth besides of its own nature beautifie the *soul*, as well as it beautifies the *countenance*. And indeed, seeing that *Joy* is more according to nature than *Sadness*, seeing it is a *Good*, as *Sadness* is an *Evil*, it must needs for this reason inspire also into it and waken the passions that are more conform to nature, and better than those which are awakened by *Sadness*. Now there is nothing more according to nature then *Goodness*. If it be objected that *Affliction* corrects us, and makes us better ; I answer, that it doth not do it out of its own nature, but by accident,

accident, as a medicine cures us by accident, although at other times it be a kind of poyson, and is alwayes in some sort contrary to the temper of our bodies. For if we consider affliction in its self, we shall finde that as it is the property of winter and ill weather to kill flowers and to despoile the trees of the ornament of their foliage, even so it blasts the beauties of the soul, soures and debases it. But above all we shall finde, that in cooling and weakening the courage it greatly impaires that generosity from whence issues the pardon of injuries. Philosophers say that *Light* doth naturally beget *Heat*, although it be not a quality of the same *species* with it, by reason of a certain affinity or correspondence of nature which is between them. I suppose it is for the same reason that *Joy* may beget in the soul goodness and vertuous inclinations, though its self be not a vertuous inclination, since that being a

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and passion, it must have some
logy with all the good passions,
adness must have also with all the
ones. But to come to the con-
ration of another cause of the
e effect, it seems also that as an
ry made us not angry, but out of
opinion we had that it had cast us
rn, when any great prosperity
es to raise us up, it must for this
son appease and sweeten the grief
ch this pretended dejection
t caused in us, since that it doth
ome sort do us reason. Or else,
raps the soul, in a great prospe-
; looking on the present which
es upon it, and offers it nothing
matter of satisfaction, and a
t perfect rest, doth equally take
eye off, both from what is to
e, and what is past, and therefore
s to remember passed injuries,
e that it cannot do it without
ing off from the present which
grateful to it, and interrupting
delicious employment: but that
which

which still puts it more strongly upon the same resolution, is, that having all on a sudden received a great blessing, it doth passionately desire to enjoy it fully, and not corrupt the sweetness thereof, and that there is nothing can so corrupt its sweetness, as a motion of hatred and revenge. For as the act of *Loving* is in its self naturally sweet, because it is very much according to nature: so the motions of *Hatred* are naturally painful and mingled with grief, because they cross nature; and because the soul doth as I may so say, wrest and distort its self, in receiving them into it, and doth ill employ its faculties. Now that all motion of revenge and hatred of another is naturally painfull and mixed with grief, is a thing that may easily be proved. For, besides that our own sense makes us acknowledge it to be true, we need only to look upon the visage of man in choler, to confesse that nothing doth more resemble the

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visage

visage of a man that is sad; and there appears something of painfull and forced, somewhat like to that one sees in the face of a *Porter* employed with all his strength to lift up a great burthen. It is even so also in all other motions of Hate. For in a word, it is as unimaginable, that a man should machinate any *black* designs, and frame within himself some malicious contrivance, without losing the native *quiet* and *serenitie* of his spirit, as that the air should continue serene when it is formed into storms and tempests, and that it should be overspread with dark clouds, before it pours down either hail or thunderbolts upon the earth. And as the spring of a Pistol is not at rest, and as it were in its due place, so long as it is cockt, and ready to give fire and kill : So our soul is without doubt restless, and out of its repose, so long as it continues as it were bent to the execution of some malicious act, and is ready to

do mischief to another. And if we will descend from the consideration of men to that of beasts, we shall there also finde some testimonies of this truth, since that they which when they are alone, seem to take pleasure in, considering the beauty of the day, of the meadows, of the rivers and forrests, and are most light-some and sportive, are also the most innocent; and that, on the contrary, all the savage and blood-thirsty ones are sad and melancholy, which may be seen both by their countenance, and in that they hate and fly the light. It is wisdom therefore in us to drive from our mindes all malicious thoughts when we would fully enjoy any great happiness: Or else, the joy which a good fortune causes in us, renders us sweet and easie to pardon injuries, because after having gotten *external* goods, we do the more violently desire those that respect the *soul*, namely *wisdom*, and *vertue*, as those only which we want,

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nt, and which remain to us to
ire.

P R O B. 16.

*What is the reason there is so much
false news spread abroad, and that
many delight to make others believe
strange things?*

Is it not because a man thinks he
doth not do very ill, nor traf-
fice much the Law of Liberty, to
hold to that which he receives from
others, some small matter, or to
see from it some petty and slight
circumstance, which yet changes the
whole face of the thing; an absurdity
like to that of an ill pay-master, that
thought he did not any great hurt,
because he was no dishonest man, in taking
away a small cypher from a paper
wherein his debt was contained,
but in his defrauding his Creditor
of a great sum under pretence that
he

he took away and blotted out only a small cyfer? Or else, do not false news arise principally from hence, that we wholly give credit to our friends when they tell us strange things; and that, on the contrary, our friends enlarge the wonder to us, because they see we are delighted with it, and that they are unwilling to deprive us of it by disabusing us, and take from us that delightful error in which we are, no more then they would wake us if they knew we were in a pleasant dream? Or else, is it because many men think they do well to make use of a *lye* to uphold the *Truth*? Or else, are we not chiefly deceived by false relations, because we think it reasonable to give credit to one that is no bad man, but hath on the contrary much of goodnesse; whereas we should consider whether he be not guilty of some weaknesse, because a man lyes through *weakness* as well as *malice*? Or lastly, may we not

not say that ill news is spread principally for this reason, that many please themselves in making others believe strange things? the truth is, experience evidently discovers this malady with which they are affected; and if it be demanded why they are thus delighted with it, methinks one may say, it is either because they would have these great and strange things be so, and that being unable to give them a *real* existence, they give them at least a *shadow* of it in printing them upon the spirits of men: Or that half-believing them, and taking pleasure to believe them, they labour to confirme themselves in their opinion, by drawing many others to be of it, and acquiring to it good store of suffrages; or that being unable to believe them in any sort, yet when they see that an another believes them, they contemplate the joy which they imprint on his eyes, and on his visage, and hear the exclamations which admiration forces

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forces from him, and the gesture puts him in, and receive hereby *reflection* of his pleasure; like in to many sick people, who tho they cannot eat themselves, yet light to see others eat with a g appetite?

P R O B. 17.

What is the reason that having long on horse-back, a man better refresh himself by wal a little on foot, than by sitting?

IS it not that as a colour is contrary to a colour then smell or a sound, by the same reason motion is more contrary to ther motion then to rest, and so effaces the impression of it, by Law which saith that things w are under the same *genus* do vigorously combat one another. Or else, is it that the body o

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horse, on which we have been a long time, hath too much pressed many parts of ours, and by this means shut up certain passages; and that when we walk, the spirits running to these parts to move them, do raise them up, and by this means open whatsoever was there pressed, or too much straightned, so that they soon recover their natural situation?

P R O B. 18.

What is the reason that when we come to rest our selves after much walking we finde our selves more weary a while after?

IS it because the heat which motion drew into our parts rendred them more supple, and obedient to the will, in dilating the nerves; and that after we have rested a while we have lost this heat, but we have not lost our wearinesse? Or else, is it

is because when we walk, our sweat runs down; but when we come afterwards to rest, it sticks upon our skin and benums it, by its humidity, as also by its coldness, when the repose of the body hath given it means to grow cold? We see by experience, that those that come from swimming, feel their arms and legs weak, as if they had been beaten, by reason of a cold moisture that rests upon them. It is observed likewise, that when after a long motion we come to rest our selves, we sweat presently much more; and this is because the motion of the parts of our body doth not then hinder that by which the drops of sweat do descend by their narrow passages, the pores. For, as every body knows, two several motions do very often hinder one the other.

P R O B. 19.

Why is it good not to let a wicked man that hath power to do what mischief he please, perceive that we are jealous of him?

IT is good, first, because he that would do wrong unjustly, hath yet need of a *pretence*, which how vain and frivolous soever it be, may at the least amuse his spirit, and hinder him from considering and clearly discerning the ugliness and injustice of his action. For, as he that is resolved to be let blood, and hath stretched forth his arm, yet turns his head another way out of a certain horror which nature hath of every thing that hurts any part of our body: So he that is resolved to do an unjust and wicked action, doth yet turn away his eyes from the injustice which he sees in it, out of a natural

of Problems.

a natural horreur, and endeavour not to see it at all, or at least to see it lesse clearly. This is very handsomely represented by *Esop*, in a fable of the *Wolfe* and the *Lamb* that drank at the side of the same river for though the *Wolfe* was resolved to devour the *Lamb*, and saw that it was best for him to do it presently for fear least any one should come to her succour, yet he stayed a while to reason with her, being not able to put himself on this action, without setting before his eyes some colour and shew of justice. He began therefore to complain, that he troubled the water; but because she replied that this could not be, because she drank a great way below him, which was so clear a reason that it shut out all appearance of the contrary, he could not yet forbear the committing of this evil, and seeks another pretence somewhat lesse void of colour, in telling that she knew well enough, that

Father and Mother and all her Ancestors had been his enemies. Not but that this second reason was very extravagant, seeing it was the sole cruelty of the Wolfe, which had bred in the Ancestors of the Lamb this hatred, which made them only *avoid*, not *wrong* him: but neverthelesse this pretence for want of another, served to furnish him with some appearance of Justice, without which nature cannot be moved or undertake any thing. According to this then, though a wicked man may be resolved to do us a mischief, and hath power to do it, yet he wants a pretence, which he may use towards himself, and whereby he may (if I may be bold to say so) finde obedience in his own faculties; We should be therefore so far from venturing to furnish him with one, that we ought carefully to remedy all things from which he may draw one. But we shall furnish him with a pretence and shadow of reason, if we let him
see

See that we distrust him, although it be not without just occasion, and this shadow of reason will serve him to conquer that resistance which he findes in his own nature. Secondly, it is good not to give wicked men any testimony that we distrust them, because if they believe that we cannot so much as imagine they are about to commit a great injustice, they will judge us the honestest, and farther from all treacherous and evil thoughts, and so will be more ashamed to sin before us, and discover to us the baseness and ugliness of their souls. Besides, if a wicked man thinks that we esteem him an honest man, he cannot without regret go about to destroy by his actions this belief which is advantageous and glorious to him; and will be so much the more loth to do it, as he believes, that it is well established in our minds, because that

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in doing it, he sees he wrongs himself: but on the contrary, if he thinks we have already an ill opinion of him, he will not have so great a desire to acquire our esteem, as he would to preserve himself in it, were he possessed of it; because the desire of *preserving* that which a man hath, is more natural then that of *getting*. In the fourth place, if he believe that we are in a profound and entire ignorance of the wrong he intends us, he sees by the same means, that in doing it he will cause us more grief, then if we had expected it, and provided ourselves for it. Now the wickedest man hath naturally more of repugnance to bring a great grief upon any one then a little one. Lastly, besides all these reasons, there is this still to be considered, that if any one thinks that men account him an honest man, or that they do not think him very bad.

bad, this serves to persuade him, that what is believed of him, is true, and that indeed he hath not very bad inclinations. Now there is no better, nor handsomer way of reforming by degrees the mind of a wicked man, then to persuade him that he hath some seeds of vertue, and an inclination to worthy things, because that loving himself, and every thing that is in him, he will consequently love vertue, if he believes that it is one of his qualities, and a part of his being; and he will also love virtuous men if he thinks he is like them, as he would love a man that hath nose or eyes like his own. In a word, it is certain that every one acts according to the *Idea* that he hath of himself, and according to that which he believes himself to be: for, those objects which we have most ordinarily before our minds, do by degrees communicate their qualities to our
souls.

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and our actions; Now there
object any man hath more
ently before his mind then
elf, so that if he believes him-
vicked, the image which he
of himself must needs exasper-
him and make him still worse
worse; On the contrary, if
inks himself inclined to good-
this belief must needs sweeten
y little and little and inspire
him better inclinations. This
we have to say upon this
em, which methinks we have
is means sufficiently illustrat-
But yet we believe we should
e way add, that the *Rule*
it gives, is not alwayes true;
herein are many *Distinctions*
used: and especially we
have a care, whether he whose
ice we fear, be a man *intirely*
ed, or whether he have *some*
principles, and be not yet
resolved to do unjustly: For
be absolutely wicked, we must
not

not let him see that we distrust him, for the aforesaid reasons; but if he hath something of generous, and be not wholly confirmed in his evil resolution, it is many times good to let him perceive (but with humility and without bitterness, and rather obliquely than in a direct and open manner) that we see well enough he intends to wrong us, that our unhappiness is manifest unto us, and that we have not any hope. For, besides that this raises more pitty in him, it troubles him to be accounted more unjust than he is, and having something of generous in him, he labours to refute by his actions this ill opinion which we have of him, and desires to shew untous that we were in an error when we had such a conceit of him.

P R O B. 20.

Thence comes it that Beasts do naturally know how to swim, and that Man hath need to learn ?

They answer commonly, that Man doth not naturally know how to swim, as Beasts do, because at the first time he tries to do it, he is seized with a *Fear* which hinders him from making use of his legs and arms freely. But I do not approve this answer; for beasts have at least as much fear as man, the first time one casts them into the water; and I have seen some of them that would tremble for fear a long time after, and remain agonisht, and for all that ceased not to swim very well. Besides, if it were only *Fear* that hindered man from knowing how to swim, this would be nothing to them that are

very bold, and cast themselves without fear into great dangers; and a man in this case would know at least how to swim in the water of a *Bath*, in the midst of a company of his *friends*, since that then he would have nothing to fear: Or else he would know how to swim in a very narrow brook, where the bottom may be seen all the way, and can leave him no considerable fear. Since therefore this answer doth not suffice, and leaves the difficulty wholly untoucht: I conceive rather, that a man doth not naturally know how to swim, because the first time he tries, he cannot choose but manage his legs and arms by *Reason*, and that this hinders him from doing it right, because it is an action that must be done by the *imagination* only, after a brutish and blind manner. We see clearly by experience, that there are many things which we do worst, when we would do them by *Reason*. Besides, I believe it is

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ought for a man, the first time he
es to swim, to be prepossess'd with
s belief, that he doth not know
w to swim; whereas beasts are ex-
pt from all this preoccupation :
, to believe infallibly that one
th not know how to do any thing,
a disposition to do it ill, and to
me scurvily off. But, besides these
o reasons, in my opinion it is very
markable, that when beasts swim,
ey are in their *natural* posture, be-
use they have not an *erect* stature;
d do move according as they have
inclination to move naturally,
mely, with all their feet at once;
d that on the contrary, man lying
his length upon the water to
im, is not in the posture in which
e should naturally be, and so hath
e greater pains to move himself in
is manner; as even upon the earth
would be painful to him to march
pon all four. Or else I may say
pon this subject, that the difficulty
not so much to know why crea-

tures that are much more *light* than man, are more proper to swim; but why he doth not know how to swim as well as Oxen, horses, and such other creatures that are *heavier* than he: To which I answer, that it is because Oxen, and Horses, and such other beasts, have an inward capacity and cavity of their bodies much greater, which is the cause that though their bodies sink deeper under water by reason of their weight, there yet remains part thereof above; and that it happens to them as it doth to vessels that are high built, to wit, that they continue above the water, whilst others that are not so much laden, but are much less, do sink. Or else too, one may rationally say, that beasts do naturally swim, because they have for the most part a longer neck than man, so that although all the rest of the body be heavy enough to sink under water, yet in holding up their necks they take their breath at ease;

whereas mans body being ready naturally to sink under water as well as theirs, he hath not a neck long enough, to keep his head notwithstanding out of the water, and by this means keep himself from being choaked. So then *Beasts* have in this received from nature divers advantages above *Man*, in which she hath not done him any wrong, but on the contrary hath manifested the same wisdom which she shews in all other things, that she is guided by a most admirable and penetrating judgement, which fore-sees things that depend upon a long train of consequences. For, this wisdom foresaw that *Man* only among all other creatures should know how to make *Boats* and *Bridges*, or to pass the rivers on *Hors* back.

PROB. 21.

What is the reason that the fruits which grow at the tops of the boughs are the best?

IS it because that which is most *earthy* and *gross* in the nourishment, cannot reach to the tops of the boughs, so that they receive only that which is more *subtile*, and doth easier find passage through the narrow streights of the wood? Or else, is it because that the tops of the branches are the *newest* and *youngest* parts of the tree, and that for this reason they have the more vertue? Or else, is it for that the fruit which grows at the tops of the boughs, are more exposed to the *rayes* of the *Sun*, which ripens them better? Or else, because they are more exposed to the beating of the rain, which serves to soften their hardness, and

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to make them also sweeter; as we see that fruit is sometimes softened between our hands, and made sweeter according as we handle it? Or else is it, that when there is abundance of nourishment in a tree, passeth to the extremities, after it hath provided for the necessities of all the other places; but that being arrived at the extremities, and not able to pass further, it amasses it self, and so feeds those fruits that grow there the better, which consequently must have more of juice and of savour. Methinks one may express the course of this nourishment by the example of a brook, which runs long as it finds any way, but meeting at last some obstacle which is before it, and hinders it from running further, it swells and gathers waters into an heap. Or else, last is it that the nourishment, according as it ascends from the root to branches, is still more and more collected by the *Natural heat* of the

the tree; so that for this cause it must needs be that which comes to the ends of the branches, must be most concocted, and most purified?

PROB. 22.

Why do good men think they ought to speak in proper terms of other Passions and Vices, but not of things that regard wantonness and corporal Love?

SOME antient Philosophers discursing upon the same Question which we have here propounded, have thought that this modesty which hinders us from speaking plainly of things that belong to lasciviousness, and the lower and more terrestrial part of Love, was but an abuse and vain ceremonie. Their reasons were, that since we speak in plain terms of all other vices, whereof some are far worse, and that we

E S dare

dare pronounce the names of *Treason, Sacrilege, Impiety, Assassination, Cruelty*, there is no colour of Reason why we should not with the same boldness speak of *vicious Love*, much less that we should not dare to speak of all the effects of *lawful Love*, which hath nothing in it irregular. Whereunto they added, that whatever one might do without sin, one might also speak without sin. *Montaigne* seems to have been of the same opinion; for in the first Chapter of the third Book of his *Essays*, he saies, that the rule which forbids us to express some things in plain terms, is a false rule; and that he scorns to reckon it amongst his true duties. He saies afterwards, that it is the Daughter indeed of true wisdom, as other things which respect Ceremony, but a bastard one; and that he which should undeceive the world of it, would not perhaps do so much mischief, because man acquitting himself of these false offices, thinks himself discharged

charged of so much of the obligation which he hath to natural offices. At last he adds, that it is only a sparing of Vice, not to dare speak of it, but by a Periphrasis. For my part, I think that the general opinion of men which is contrary hereto, must needs be better grounded, and that they have reason to look upon it as a piece of brutishness in those that speak plainly of whatsoever belongs to corporeal Love. And I do justly call this opinion *general*, whatever *Montaigne* was pleased to say, since there is no true History found by which it may be proved that there was ever any people wholly void of this modesty; and although there have been some, doubtless it was only a savage people, and scarcely participant of common sense, as certain Nations that have been lately discovered. And a thing doth not cease to be of *common* sense, though it be contradicted out of simplicity by some particular people. And though we could

could not tell how to answer to the subtilties here alledged against the general opinion, yet in my judgement it were not wisdom to disbelieve it, and follow them. But for a'll that, I conceive the truth being on our side, will furnish us with arguments to prove, that the objections which are urged against it, are weak and ill-grounded. For in the first place, *Montaigne* himself, in that Chapter where he is so much against the common opinion in this business, doth nevertheless confess, that there is no action which ought so much to humble a man, as this which is here in question; that they are the feet of the Peacock which abate his pride; that our weakness and vanity appear there in their best apparel; that when he considers the circumstances of it, he believes that saying of the Antients, That man was made by the gods to serve them for a May-game; that all other actions admit a wise and discreet proceeding, except this only; that all other

other Passions trouble reason and assail it, but that this doth wholly annihilate it. I think that in all this he saith nothing but truth, but we may from hence draw arguments against himself; and indeed this truth being supposed, we have ground to say, that then it is impudent and vitious to speak openly of a thing, where the inconstancy of our judgement and the weakness of our nature seems to be at its best, after a particular manner, because it is a sign that he which doth it, doth not much trouble himself with the perfection and dignity of his soul; and that he doth without regret discover the defects and vanities of it. If it be further objected, that yet we speak openly of *Perfidiousness, Sacrilege, Ingratitude and Cruelty*; To this I answer, that good men indeed do openly and without scruple, speak of these things, and that no man is offended at it, because it is presupposed, they are things to which they are not subject.

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t. It is not so in the follies and did things which *Love* makes men commit, when for hope of a corporal pleasure, it makes a man submit himself with too much weakness to the sex, which nature hath made in-our to him : For they are follies which the best have been subject; they are weaknesses from which good men are not totally exempt; even those which abominate all uncleavies, Treasons, Thefts and Incontinencies, and hate them with a perfect hatred, do yet find themselves weak on this side; and that is the reason they cannot speak of the base and brutish part of this passion without blushing: and truly it would be impudent, if herein memory of their infirmity did produce this effect in them, if they should speak openly and boldly of their vice, instead of avoiding the representation of it to themselves by formal and direct expressions. To confess that this is so, it

it is to be considered, that we should think a rogue impudent and brutish without measure, if being surprized in the fact, and being questioned of the manner in which he committed his theft, he should speak of it at large, and with all the circumstances, without blushing and casting down his eyes for shame; and that on the contrary we should think he had some remainders of probity left in him, when he dares not speak of it but with difficulty and by halves, making us guess his meaning, rather than expressing it. Even so a man that we know hath committed a notable Treason, would be thought very impudent, if he should in company make long discourses of Traytors and Treason, and if on the contrary such kind of discourse should not put him into a kind of confusion. In a word, it becomes him that knows himself guilty, to be ashamed of every thing that represents to him his fault. And as for that which

was

was said, that it is only a sparing the vice of wantonness, not to speak openly of it as of others, it is as ill-grounded as the rest. For as for a lye, parricide, murther, impiety, avarice, cowardize and vanity, because they are things which have an ugliness, which is *essential* to them, and therefore inseparable, it is very true, that the more lively one can describe them, the more hatred and horreur he raises of them; nay it may be maintained, that a lively conception of them is enough to make one fly them, without the assistance of any other discourse; just as men run away from blows, or from an house on fire, without any need of perswasions. But it is quite otherwise in Corporal Love; for it hath no *essential* deformity, and is bad only by *accident*, namely, for want of necessary *circumstances*; and when it carries us in pursuit of its object, with *excess*, or by base and unworthy *means*. And therefore to moderate

derate it, it is not at all necessary to set it forth to the life, but on the contrary, by how much the more lively and in proper terms it is described, so much the more doth the imagination of those that hear so indiscreet a lesson, grow warm with that base heat which it is accustomed to kindle there. And hence I draw one strong reason more, in favour of that truth I maintain. For since that to speak in proper terms of this low and ignoble part of Love, is rather helping than weakening it, he that discourses of it in this manner, must needs have a design to render it more violent, either in himself or others; both which are equally beastly. Or else it must needs be, that at the same time, he that talks thus, and that he is with his friends, whose converse ought to elevate his soul to nobler and more spiritual pleasures, he feels himself moved with that lascivious and terrestrial ardour; otherwise he would
never

never love to represent to himself the effects thereof so distinctly, because they are of such a nature, that if the imagination be not delighted with them, it is wounded by them, it being not possible there should be a *medium* between these two extremes.

PROB. 23.

Whence comes it that they say, whatsoever cures us, and is good for us, dislikes us; and that on the contrary, we love that which hurts us?

IS it that in this they do not say true, but that as the Time whilest we are in sadness seems to us longer, for the same reason the accidents which are offensive to us, seem to us the more frequent? Truly I think that from this Source descend many other *Vulgar Errors*; as for example these; That a man is hurt sooner

sooner in the same part where he is already ill : That the wittiest children do commonly die before they can give their parents that contentment which they hope for from them : That disasters follow one another, and scarce ever come single : For as we desire that these accidents should never happen, so for fear least they happen, we think that they happen alwayes. Or else, doth not the errour wherein men are in this business, proceed from hence, that when we love that which profits us, no man takes any notice of it, because it is a thing conformable to Reason and Nature, and upon which our spirit slides away smoothly, as our hand slides upon a polished body, where it finds no rub or obstacle; and that on the contrary, when we love that which hurts us, as it is a thing that astonishes us; and makes us stick some time to search the causes of it, so we see it the better, and imprint it the deeper into our memories.

memories ? Or else happens it not thus, in effect, through the imperfection of finite things, which produces also many other effects, that seem to be against nature ? As for example, we see that Difficulty *whets* the appetite, whereas it should rather *dull* it ; and that Evil is more active then Good, although it ought to be quite contrary, and many other the like things ; so that this may perswade us, that it is through this very imperfection that wholsom things offend, and hurtful things delight us ? Or else, is it because the remedy ought to be contrary to the disease, and that contraries redouble their force against one another by an *Antiperistasis* ? Physick for this reason doth at first heighten the disease, and consequently also the pain. And as Physick doth at first re-inforce and heighten the disease, may it not also be that hurtful things for the same reason do delight us more often at the first, and encrease our vigour,

vigour, and that therefore they please us? If we suppose for example, that a man be sick for want of heat, it may be if he uses cold things that are naught for him, they will at the first refresh him and give him some strength, by making of his heat increase, and redouble it self by an *Antiperistasis*. Or else, is not nature at first delighted with things that redouble its evil, because that by increasing it, they may in some sort stupifie and dull its sense? And is it not, on the contrary, hurt by those things that cure it? because that in restoring it to its strength by little and little, they do as it were awaken it out of that lethargie in which the disease held it, and so make the sense of it the more quick? Or else, is it that Nature when she hath need to be cured, is depraved and ill disposed: so that it is no wonder if in this condition she be offended with that which is good, and pleased with that which is bad for her? Or else.

else, is it not that as a man cannot take a spot out of his *clothes* without making the place a little more thredbare, nor refine *mettals* without diminishing them, nor cause any great good in a *Common-wealth* without wrong to some : so also we cannot cure our *bodies* of any great infirmity, but we must do it some damage; and that as the remedy in curing us, doth us some hurt, this is the reason why it is irksom to the sense? If you ask me in particular, What is the reason that almost all Medicines are bitter, and odious to take? (wherein methinks a great part of the difficulty of this Problem consists) I answer, that this happens from its quality, because if the Medicine were not offensive to the *palate*, neither would it offend the *stomach*, seeing that it is from one and the same quality, that things which have been displeasing to the taste when they were in the mouth, do excite also a sense of horrour in

the stomach and offend it. Now, if the Medicine do not raise a sense of horror in our stomachs, Nature would not use its utmost strength to rid it self of it, and would not reject together with it, the ill humours that made it sick: for I think it is very probable, that it is by this means that most Medicines purge us.

P R O B. 24.

What is the reason that Children in Winter, though their face and hands seem to show that they are more afflicted with cold than men grown, yet are not easily perswaded to warm themselves?

IS it not because to warm themselves they must stand still a good while in the same place, and that Children love to be constantly in motion, out of a kind of Impatience, which is natural to our spirit at that age?

age ? Or else is it , that when they are cold and come nigh to the fire , it's heat at first instead of comforting , doth more afflict them ; which happens , because it re-inforceth at first the cold of their bodies by an *Antiperistasis* ; and that as they want experience and reason , and follow the first sentiment of nature , they reject this wholsom remedy for want of knowledge to judge , that by and by they shall find comfort by it ? Or else is it , that though their bodies be more easily altered by the cold , then those of full grown men , as it is plain to the eye ; yet this alteration is not so painful and grievous to them ; the reason of it is , because the cold hurts chiefly by too much hardening and making stiff all the parts of our body , and that theirs are so tender and so soft , that by reason thereof , they cannot but very hardly be brought into the contrary extream ?

PROB. 25.

Whence comes it that when we are in affliction, we are better diverted by the representation of some Tragick History, or by the recital of some great misfortune, then by more merrery shews, or facetious tales?

IS it that the soul, being lively afflicted, shuns light and vain joyes, because that without truely comforting it, and without taking away the grounds of its affliction, they do only dilate the spirits by a superficial emotion of pleasure, with which they tickle the imagination, and that this dilatation of the spirits cannot be but offensive to the soul, if it still keeps its sadnesse at the bottom of the heart, since that it is for its good, and to the end that it may have the more strength, it keeps them together in affliction? Indeed

it seems to be for this reason chiefly, that the soul being thus afflicted, doth thus fly from gay and delightful objects, and loves sad ones; just as a weak eye hates chearful and light colours; and on the contrary, loves such as are dark and have but little light. Or else, when we are profoundly afflicted, and are present at shows full of mirth, are we not displeased to see others laugh there with a most pure and perfect joy, because this doth more sadly put us in mind of our own misfortune: whereas in hearing read, or seeing acted a Tragick history we finde our selves lesse unhappy by considering the miseries befallen others? Or else, doth not the recital of other folks misfortune comfort us, chiefly for this reason, that for a time they take off our thoughts and affections to our selves, and fix them upon a foreign object? Or else, is it that as they say nothing doth better drive out one love then another love? for the

the same reason nothing doth better expell one sad thought then another. Without doubt this reason is upon good ground, and to speak more generally, when ever one desires to take away from a man wholly and for ever, any strong passion, one should endeavour to put him first into some other passion that is nigh it. For when we have wrought any change in a mind that had given it self up through length of time to some certain inclinations, we may after that bring him to what we please; as we see that when a man hath moved a stone a little out of its place, which long lying had fastened to the earth, afterwards he draws it whither he pleases; Or else the sadnesse which Tragedies and other such like spectacles beget, is it not more apt to diminish afflictions, then are other things more sportful, for this universal reason, That an evil is alwayes more easily cured by another evil; then by a good, which

happens thus, because to go from evil to good is a longer way, and must receive a greater change then to passe from one evil to another.

P R O B. 26.

Why do some noises make a man sleep?

IS it that noises which one hears near at hand being only a *motion* of the *air*, or at least such as cannot be formed unless the air be moved; do excite some *motion* in the organs of the *brain*, by striking the air enclosed in the ears; and that this motion being very proper to hinder the operation of the spirit, makes a man sleep? Or else, doth not the noise of wind or rain, or of a spring make us sleep, by *delighting* us? And therefore we see also that many fall asleep more easily when they make some part of their body be rubbed, through the *pleasure* that comes

comes of it ; and that children also sleep sooner and with the more facility, when we rock them , because they *love* to be rocked ? Indeed, that *pleasure* may help to produce sleep, methinks may further be proved, in that they which are in a great and profound pleasure, whether of body or of mind, do shut their eyes, stretch their arms carelessly, and continue in the same posture, as if they were really asleep, and that we say pleasure puts a man as it were into a sound. But why hath Pleasure this property to be more apt to cause sleep than the other passions of the soul ? Is it not that the passions being necessarily either pleasures, or griefs, or desires, or hopes, or fears, the soul that hopes, or fears, or desires, or suffers, is in solicitude, and searches every thing, and therefore it sets its reason on work, and so hinders it self of being seized by sleep, whereas when it is in pleasure, it searches after nothing, being

content with the present, and therefore its reason ceases to act, and by ceasing to act causes sleep to ensue; just as Night comes when the Sun ceaseth to shine. Besides, noises that tickle the ear, do make us sleep, not only because they give us *pleasure*, but also because this pleasure is altogether *sensual*. For a *spiritual pleasure* makes us imploy our *reason*, and so keeps up within us this *internal light* of the mind, which doth no less hinder us from sleeping than an *external light* which strikes upon our eyes; and on the contrary, a pleasure moerly *corporal*, is an obstacle to *meditation*. But why of sensual pleasures doth that of *hearing* produce sleep? Is it not because it is that only which we can admit in an intire repose of the whole body, and without doing any thing on our part? For, for example, the pleasures that come from delightful *savours*, cannot be tasted without moving the tongue and jaws; and

we cannot also well enjoy a good odour if we do not make some effort to draw it in and smell it; nor can we well admit the pleasures of the eye without turning the eyes this way and that, and without straining to hold them open, by drawing back towards the forehead the skin that covers them: but to Hear you cannot say we should need to do any such thing; Or else may we not explain this Problem thus, that a pleasant noise which strikes the Ear, produceth first a suspension and cessation of all other thoughts, by that sweetnesse which charms us, and afterwards takes from us even the sence of it self: because an object that hath been long present to the faculty, strikes it no more, and is not perceived; which appears in that Custom is so proper to render both good and bad things insensible to us, and that he which hath long had his mind fixt upon a work, that he composes, becomes unable to judge

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tly of it, untill he hath for a
e given his mind some other
ct? But why must the noises
h make one sleep, be in some
uniform? and why, for instance,
the noise of a *spring*, because it
of one kind, make us sleep bet-
then of a *musical instrument*,
h yet is more sweet? Is it that
ises which are not uniform, the
object is not alwaies present to
faculty, that they have in them
e or *sharpe* sounds, *high* or *low*,
er or *swifter* ones; whereas in
es that are uniform, it is precise-
e same object which is alwayes
ent to the faculty, and that by
means it may, after it hath
ed all other objects of our
ights, efface it self also, and make
imperceivable, by the continu-
of its action, as we said, and so
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ear only; but that the pleasure, which the harmony of a musical instrument creates, is not a pleasure of the ear only, but also of the *imagination* and of the *memory*; since that a man must compare in it one concord with another, and consider the proportion of the sounds to one another, to dislike or approve it; and that seeing it exerciseth the fancy and the memory, it is not to be wondered, if it be not so proper to make a man sleep?

P R O B: 27.

What is the reason we aggravate our miseries, and love to perswade others that we are very unfortunate?

IF we search why we aggravate our misfortunes, we cannot deceive our selves in saying it is to perswade others that we are very unfortunate.

But

But it is a greater difficulty to know for what reason we desire they should believe so, because oftentimes they are persons that we do not hope to receive any succour from, and that our very misery rendring us less able to be useful to others, may hinder many base and mercenary minds from doing us any good. To enquire then the cause of this humour of the afflicted; is it not, in the first place, that they are never assured that any man may not for the future be in a capacity to help him; and therefore they tell their misfortunes to all they see, and aggravate them to them, to the end that if hereafter they should discover any means to succour them, the pity which they have raised in them, may presently produce its effect? Or else do they desire to have all that come near them know their evil, and believe it to be very great, thereby to incite them to give them some consolation? Or do they not hope, that he to whom they have

aggravated their misery, if he be not able to help them, may at the least pray for them, and that these prayers may prevail with the divine goodness? Or else, do they not desire that those very persons from whom they cannot hope for any succour, should bemoane them, for that they think that some body else - that shall have the means to deliver them from their miseries, will do it so much the more willingly, if he sees that many persons do compassionate him, and are affected therewith, because the more general the good is which we are intreated to do, and the more persons it regards, the more ready are we to do it? Or else is it that *to be beloved* being in it self a good, we do therefore exaggerate our miseries, thereby to raise pitty, and by pitty love, because we know naturally that pitty is so near to love, that there is nothing more easie then to slip from one to the other? Or else, do we not desire that a man should believe

believe that we suffer very much, because we desire he should talk much and long of us, both while we live and after our death, and that we foresee that men will talk so much the more of us, as they think that our miseries have been great? Or is it not out of a vain affectation of glory which is annexed to constancy, and to be in some sort admired by others, that we paint forth as very excessive, incomparable, and in a word, much greater than they are, the evils which men see we suffer with so much patience, our Vanity being so essential and united to our souls, that Grief it self cannot expell it, and that that accompanies it even in the midst of torments, upon the Rack, and at the Stake, as the *Stoicks* said of their Wisemans Happinesse? Or else, do we aggravate our miseries, because through humane weaknesse, we do in our miseries many times think that the Providence which governs the Universe, doth

doth us some kind of wrong, and that to prove it, we dare not alledge our perfections, and our innocence ; but we alledge only the evils which it sends us, which we say are greater then all that ever man suffered ? Or else, because we believe that all things have their course in the world, and succeed one another ; do we not for this reason delight to perswade our selves, that we have been for the time past very unhappy, to the end that we may build upon this foundation hopes of being happy for the future, and of seeing our felicity return in its course, as the Day returns after Night, Summer after Winter, and Fair weather after a long Storm ? Or as *Cesar* very wisely painted forth to his Souldiers the enemies forces much greater then they were, to the end that afterwards seeing them lesse, they should lesse fear them, and be provided of resolution and courage more then enough ; doth not our soul by a like

like artifice fain to its self its misfortunes greater then they are, to the end that afterwards returning to consider the truth of the businesse, it may receive some comfort in undeceiving its self; and that when the violence of its evil shall return to oppresse it, it may have laid in a large provison of courage, and find its self provided of more constancy then is requisite for the undergoing of it? Or else do we not aggravate our miseries, to provoke our selves to *weep* more abundantly, because we finde that *tears* are a refreshment to us; and therefore also in Tragedies, afflicted persons do commonly exhort one another to shed abundance of Tears? Or else, to conclude, do we thus aggravate our evils, because we think that great and excellent things, having only great destinies, either in good or evil, it is some token of elevation and excellence to have been exercised by great evils? If any man
object

object to me, that herein we should make but a simple consequence; I do freely confesse it; but I believe he will also grant me, that the mind of man hath very many weakneses and follies, and especially that he is so passionate for his own excellence, that he lets not slip by in vain the least shadow of the least mark that he can give to himself of it. And therefore we see many men blame themselves for having a bad memory, that from thence they may draw some advantage for their judgement, because though they see this consequence cannot but be very weak, since that there are everywhere thousands of blockheads that have neither memory nor judgement, yet they think that this is some slight sign of it, because of an opinion that is received by many to this purpose, the truth whereof we do not here examine: and that which is yet more, you please men, if you only tell them that they have an
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made like some very able man,
and every body reverences and
admires; nay they please themselves
to think they resemble him in their
conduct; or, briefly, in having
heard of his, nay to believe that
they have had a destiny like to his,
and like success in certain encoun-

For, as in judgements of
suits, there are some things
which being not able to pass for en-
tire proofs, do pass for semiproofs,
and for less; so our soul in the
course of reasons, by which it labours
to prove its own excellency, receives
vain ones, not as entire proofs,
things which being collected
and massed in a sufficient large-
ness, do give it means to flatter
it with some fancy which is ad-
apt to it, and to attribute
to it very likely some perfection.

P R O B. 28.

Why do many laugh to see another man fall?

THere are some who propounding this Question, answer in one word, that it is out of malice. And if a man object to them, that many of those that laugh at such a mischance, do not cease to have very honest minds, and a great deal of true goodness: They might answer, that a soul really good, may yet have, together with its goodness, some light mixture of malice; as we see there is scarcely a man so wise that hath not some light weakness of spirit: As when we say a man is sanguine, we do not mean that he hath not a drop of Phlegm, Choler, or Melancholy humour in his body, but only that sanguine is predominant in him; so when we say a man

is wise, good, or ingenuous, we are not bound to conceive him exempt and wholly purged from folly and vice ; For in truth it signifies no more then that Wisdom, Vertue and Ingenuity are his predominant qualities : Nevertheless, it is clear that in those that laugh when they see one fall, it is not properly malice ; which I inerr, not only because they do not laugh if he take any considerable hurt, but also and chiefly because they are as ready to laugh at themselves, if by chance they burn or cut their own fingers ; or if the wind blow their hats off, or if they are surprized, or caught with a shower before they can get any shelter, or if any other petty disorder befalls them, the reason is, because these petty disorders have alwayes in them something of *gratesque*, *extraordinary* and *sudden* ; and because by these three qualities they do in some sort tickle the imagination.

PROB. 29.

What is the reason that those who embrace Civil and Worldly affairs with too violent an ardour, are subject to lose all sense of Religion, and the knowledge of a Deity?

THough we had not learnt from the authority of the Holy Scriptures, that the care of the things of the world, and the deceit of riches, do blind the understandings of men in respect of the mysteries of Faith, experience would sufficiently prove it; since that it happens even at this day very frequent, that those which settle their affections too much on the affairs of the world, and have in their minds no other design but of worldly advancements, do so lose the sense of the verities of Religion that there remains to them only an outward profession of it, with which,

as with a superficial kind of beauty, they cover the irregularity of their opinions. To say from hence, that they wish there were no true Religion, that they might give themselves the more liberty to compleat their designs all manner of wayes, and that they labour all they can to perswade themselves of it, and at last do perswade themselves, it is to say very much, but perhaps not altogether enough, because many times it happens that the more we desire to chase out of our minds a belief, the less able are we to do it. It must therefore be added further, that as those who addict themselves to the contemplation of things sublime and abstract, do become unfit for low things, such as are the affairs of the world: So by the same reason, those that exercise their minds too much about low things, and such as fall under the eye, must become unfit for the discerning of sublime things, for that our soul is so miserable

able

able that it can hardly gain on one side but it loses on the other, and its perfections do very often shock one against another, and are incompatible. But besides these two reasons, there is a third more nice and not so easily to be perceived. The better to comprehend it, we must first consider, that when our eyes have been too long fixed upon the Sun, there do remain upon them some certain impressions, which make us think we see its image in all the objects we look on: So when our mind is strongly fastened upon the consideration of any one object, it thinks that it sees it everywhere else, and is also ready to believe that every one looks upon that which he doth with a great deal of earnestness, as he that hath long turned round, believes that all things turn with him. Thus, for example, a man of an *Amorous* complexion, all whose desires look only at Love, is apt to think that all things in the world are

undertaken for Love; that it is this which for the most part playes his own game under the masque of Ambition, or some other passion; and that even wars, and all the greatest troubles of State, are only the effects of some secret Love. But an *Ambitious* man, out of the love he bears to Glory, takes it quite otherwise, and believes rather that all is done out of Ambition; that Covetousness it self looks at that indirectly; that Learning, as well as War, aims at nothing else; and that in Love it self, the Ambition to conquer the mind of a Mistress, or to surmount a Rival, are our principal motives. A *Souldier* will be ready to think that Learning hath no other rational end but the Military Art; but on the contrary a *Scholler* will judge that War hath no other end but to provide that wise men may quietly and peaceably apply themselves to contemplation. An *Orator* will tell you that Philosophy was invented
only

only to move the passions of the Judges handsomly and with a dress. But on the contrary, a *Philosopher* will rather judge that Eloquence hath no other end but the application of Philosophie. It follows then, according to the preceding Doctrine, that when a man that hath already a propension to impiety, hath the affairs of the world too much in his head, and the means by which they are brought about; and he thinks, night and day, of nothing but politick tricks and gins by which he may entrap others; This imagination by little and little becomes plausible to him: That Religion it self is an artifice that tends to the bringing about of these very affairs of the world; and that it is a State-device of the Politicians, because he thinks that every one looks upon that which himself doth with abundance of affection, and thinks he sees everywhere else the same objects which his own mind is filled with, and to which

which he is too much addicted.

PROB. 30.

What is the reason that the lowest spirits are commonly most perswaded of the truth of their opinions ?

IS it not because that as the earth and gross bodies have this advantage over the noblest and most subtile ones, that they are more firm in their places, and cannot so easily be removed; so gross and dull souls have certain advantages over others, amongst which this must be reckoned to be firm in their opinions? Or should we not rather say that this is rather a disadvantage to them, and that it is harder to take away their errors, then to take from wise men their sound belief; for the same reason that makes it harder to cure a man of a disease than

than to make him sick? Or else, is it not that as a man that stands on tiptoes, cannot be so firm in this posture as he is in that lies along and keeps himself with all his weight on the ground: So wise men cannot be so firm in their opinions, to which they came only by forcing and straining themselves; as fools are in theirs, into which they suffered themselves to fall as it were with all their weight, being far from striving to raise themselves up again? Or else, is it that base opinions are upheld by the suffrage of the multitude, and that it is not to be wondered at, if that makes us courageously embrace an opinion, since it makes us without fear to run upon death, and assures us against the greatest dangers? Or else lastly, is it that fools for want of judgement, do not for the most part understand the reason of the able; and that on the contrary, able men do by their vivacity conceive the reasons which fools object

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against

against them, better then they do themselves, and that this difference is like proper to make those more resolute, and to weaken something the assurance of these?

PROB. 31.

Whence is it that in the greatest subjects of affliction, we do many times take up more readily a constant resolution, then in others that are much lighter?

IT is principally for two causes. First, that when we are much afraid of any misfortune, and look upon it as the greatest that can happen to us, this fear makes us very often to think of it; so that when it befalls us, we are already prepared for it, and that for this reason many times we are more easily resolute therein, contrary to the expectation of all men. The second is

that a great misfortune disabases us of the too great esteem which we set on the things of the world; and of the happiness which may be gotten in it, and proves to us on the contrary by our own experience, that all things are very fickle and inconstant. Thus then it makes us condemn it; and by that great blow which it gives us, doth as it were cut the roots by which we were tyed unto it: In a word, by afflicting us on the one side, it comforts us on the other, and furnishes us with weapons against it self.

P R O B. 32.

Wherefore are old men great talkers?

OLd men have thoughts that vex and perplex them, when they come once to be entertained with much leisure; either because they have discovered vanity in all things,

or because old age in which they are, sets before their eyes as soon as they entertain themselves in this manner, many grand incommodities, into which they are ready to fall, and lastly, the most inevitable of all evils, which is Death. They seek therefore to divert their minds from these vexatious thoughts by all means, and hither tend their household cares, to which, for this reason, they apply themselves very earnestly; but when they have nothing to do, they can only Hear, or Talk, or Read, to hinder that melancholy which their mind would give to it self in too great a leisure. But *Hearing* is not sufficient to divert their minds from thoughts that wound them, because governing themselves wholly by their own judgement, they give no great attention to the thoughts of others, or condemn them, as making account that they themselves have others taken up upon better grounds. As for *Reading*, it is an em-

ployment, which besides that it is hurtful for them; dulls their faculties, which Age hath rendred less quick; because it hath nothing that doth enough affect the senses and the mind. It is then only when they *Talk* that their minds do in good earnest lose the image of those things that afflict and trouble them, and diverts the sight from every thing that inspires it with melancholy. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if they are much delighted therewith. Or else, as *Fruit* falls more easily from the tree when it is ripe: so our *Conceits* come more fluently from us, how careful soever we be to keep them in, when they are full ripe, and that we have cleared and well digested them. Now old mens are such, because they are wise, and have made many reflections, which have disabused them of many errours. Or else, lastly, they are Talkers, for several particular reasons, as for instance, if they are

present at any solemnity or great show; they have then less curiosity than others, because they have often seen the like; therefore, instead of being attentive to see, they suffer themselves often to make large discourses, which being then very offensive to those that are near them, hath so much the more easily gotten them the name of great Talkers. Just so also, if they are at a Feast, they have less appetite than others, and are sooner satisfied. And therefore, were it only out of civility, they are obliged to Talk, which incommending those that by this means see themselves bound to make long replies, makes them so much the more blame this vice. Moreover, after the repast, they are also carried away with a desire to Talk much, to keep themselves from sleeping, because they know well it is a thing they are subject to. These are then, it seems, the principal causes of the effect we speak of, though there may be also many others.

P R O B. 33.

Whence comes it, that in all kind of things, those that do but meanly in them, are more severe and rigid Judges of others, then those that excell therein, and hold the first rank?

DO not people very much deceive themselves, when they think that to dislike all things, is a token of delicacy of judgement; whereas on the contrary, they should say, that a squeamishness both in body and mind, is a sign of sickness; and as an healthful man likes well brown bread, and less delicate viands; so a spirit of a strong and vigorous health, ought to be pleased with all things, wherein it sees shine never so little of perfection, although it will perceive the difference that is betwixt them and others; which be-

ing thus supposed, our Problem remains without difficulty; Or else shall we say, that the inclination easily to condemn others, proceeds from rudeness, and a want of natural sweetness, which is not to be found in minds that have an entire and perfect beauty, because it is a great ugliness; as on the contrary, it is a great part of the beauty of the mind to have sweet and gentle thoughts, to be ready to excuse the faults of others, and not to condemn any one? Or else as we see often, that *petty Lords* are less accountable than the *great ones*, and maintain a gravity fuller of pride, because their authority being not so well founded as that of these later, they think they must thus uphold it, by surly and arrogant looks, and by a brutish impudence: Is it not just so in the meaner wits, and do they not use this severity to condemn others, for to separate themselves thereby from the common, and labour to maintain

tain the authority they usurp, and which they perceive hath not footing and *basis* enough to uphold it self? Or else as *subordinate Judges*, are very often more severe and rigorous in their judgements then the *Sovereigns*, because it is not in their power to remit any thing of the severity of the Law: the meaner wits, are they not more hard many times to excuse a thing that is against the ordinary rules, because it is for great minds only to grant a dispensation from those rules upon certain occasions; and because those that have meaner abilities, ought not to be bold therein; nor are they, for fear, lest whiles they desire to excuse others, they be blamed themselves? Or else is it, that meaner spirits are not willing to confess in others a moderate worth, because it is troublesom to have many companions; but that when a man doth *excell* in some kind of thing, he is glad that many others do but *meanly*

t, because it is glorious and de-
 itful to have a great many in-
 iours? Or is it not, lastly, because
 at spirits love the truth more,
 I have more of ingenuity and of
 od breeding to acknowledge the
 ection that is in another, and to
 blish it with all sincerity: but the
 aner sort are not alwayes capable
 so pure and clean a candour, and
 many times dissemble their judge-
 nts upon some design? It is cer-
 n indeed, that many petty passions
 ich they cannot rid themselves
 , are capable to alter their good
 ure, and hinder them from con-
 ling with sufficient magnanimity
 others worth. For sometimes they
 ll not confess it out of an appetite
revenge, which some slight words
 th raised in them; sometime they
 use to do it out of some motion
emulation and *envy*; sometimes
 is not properly out of *envy* that
 ey are loth to own a merit far
 ove their own, but because so high

of Problems.

a perfection doth more plainly
cover to them their own *little*
and by this means makes them
Or else it may be, if they have
began to blame a thing, they will
unsay it out of *obstinacy*, and
they acknowledge they were
ceived. Or else, they will not con
that another hath any worth, or
fear lest somebody should thence
ferr by a long consequence,
they themselves have none: C
they have no interest to obs
another's glory, there will be s
friend of theirs, or else some
that is of the same *City*, or of
same *Countrey*, or of the same *P*
that they are, whom this interest
concern, and they will not pre
before him one that is *indifferent*
a *stranger*, or of a *contrary P*
In a word, there are besides m
other causes more slight and n
nice, which change the candou
their words, and make them de
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fection of another : but great minds are free from these weakneses, and undefiled with this filth, because they are less interested, and therefore worth finds more equity at their hands, and is more easily owned.

P R O B. 34.

Whence comes it that it is so easie to blame and find fault, that the least able do it best, and that it is much more hard to commend?

IS it not because there is much more ill than good in humane things, and that those which are the most perfect, are yet very imperfect, if a man examine them strictly, and with a desire to find fault? But this being supposed, that the most perfect things in this world have very great defects : Whence comes it that the meanest wits do take notice of them much more easily then they do.

do the perfections? Is it not because being ill-sighted, they see only that which exceeds, and is very great in the subjects they examine, and that as we said, the evil doth alwayes exceed? Or else, doth not the imperfection of the objects more lively affect the mind, than their perfection; for the same reason that that which hurts our bodies, is much more lively felt, then that which delights them? Or else is it, that to acknowledge worth, and to commend it, one must first know wherein the perfection and truth of things consists; but that to know and to prove that another man is not arrived at it, one needs only know wherein they do not consist. Indeed this reason seems to be most true, and to be able sufficiently to clear the difficulty of this *Problem*. For it is so easie to say wherein things do not consist, that after this manner we know the nature of *God* himself, since that being ignorant what he is, we do never-

nevertheless know him by *negation*, and we know that he is not any thing *material*, any thing *visible*, any thing *mortal*, and that he is *incapable of change*, and of the least *defect*; so that without being able to describe his greatness, we can easily blame and reprove those that speak too lowly of him. After the same manner, it is very easie to tell where the *Center of a circle* is not, and the least child can point out with his finger many places which are not the middle of it: but to know where it is, there is need of skill, time, and instruments. But if we must still search out another reason for the same effect, consists it not in this, that as one that swims is carryed by the very same water which he strikes, which he thrusts from him, and which he troubles: so he that reproves and combates any one, and doth all he can to deery him, is born up by his inventions, because that he affirms nothing of himself, and doth only maintain

maintain that, what he whom he censures says, being supposed, such and such things do follow : So that by this means he discourses oftentimes successfully of many things which he understands not, nor sees the grounds of. Truly it seems to be so; For, for instance, though I know not what a *Half-moon*, a *Counter-scarpe*, or a *Bastion* is, it is clear notwithstanding, that when he that discourses of them before me, shall come to contradict himself, either directly or indirectly, I may in using these terms which I understand not, reproach to him his contradictions, fight against him with those arms which he hath put into my hands, and appear more able and more understanding by this censure of him, then indeed I am. On the contrary, to commend any one with success, one must not suppose for true, any thing that he says, but must prove and maintain it by reasons fetched elsewhere,

PROB. 35.

What is the reason that when the Winter hath been very cold, they commonly say the Summer that follows will be very hot?

There are sometimes some flight things, the clearing whereof fails not to bring some light to our common sense, and in this number one may reckon this, which at first sight hath some difficulty, by reason that one would think the quite contrary, that if the Winter hath very much cooled the Earth and Air, they should be the more difficultly heated by the following Summer. Is it therefore quite otherwise, that the heat of the Summer finding the earth and air very cold, doth redouble its violence by the opposition of its contrary? Or else do they say so, because they see that one contrary doth

doth naturally succeed another in the same degree; as for example the water doth naturally ascend as much as it hath descended; the excess of heat in a feaver ariseth to the same violence with the excess of cold; great friendships leave behind them great enmities; and great displeasures, when they end, produce extream contentments; after an extraordinary cloudy and wet season, we enjoy an extraordinary serenity and purity of air, and much fairer then that which went before it; and one that is recovered from a great sickness, hath commonly better health then he had before, and recovers a foundness that is more firme and of a greater value, then that which he had lost. Or else is it that when the Winter hath been extraordinary cold, it hath also been necessarily dry, by the same reason the earth being very dry is disposed to receive a great heat? Or else that when it hath been long cold, it is a sign, that
the

the matter of the cold and Northern wind, or of the other causes that do cool the air, is spent for a long time, and therefore it is likely it will be very hot?

P R O B. 36.

What is the reason that Fear makes ones hair stand on end?

FOR the clearing of this Problem, I think it is needful to consider in the first place that *Admiration* and *Fear* have some affinity, and do often accompany one another. Which being so, it seems that as *Admiration* makes a *Chillness* run through ones whole body, by reason that it brings into the soul a certain shadow of *Fear*. So *Fear* makes the hair stand on end, out of some mixture of *Admiration*. Indeed this seems so much the more probable, because the frights which make the

the

the hair stand on end, must spring from a danger whose image presently strikes the soul, and yet it knows no cause of it, and that those frights which come upon us when we think we see dead men, or Ghosts, or Devils, do chiefly produce this effect, because they are not only *fearful* things, but also very *admirable*, as being supernatural. *Virgil* hath excellently well comprized this; for when he would expresse the *Fear* which the ghost of his wife *Cressa* strook into *Aeneas*, the prodigy of *Polydorus's* tomb, the arrival of *Mercury*, that came to bring him a message from *Jupiter*; or the *Fear* that *Turnus* was in, seeing an infernal monster flap his buckler with its wings: upon all these occasions he puts down this circumstance, that their hair stood up right, because that all these things were as *Admirable* as *terrible*: But in other kinds of fear, he is contented to mention only *coldness* and *trembling*.

And

And if any demand of me why *Admiration* makes the hair to stand up right? I answer, that the soul, having its faculties intent on the consideration of that which appears admirable, doth also contract the organs of the brain, and with them the skin that covers the head. Now a man may easily imagine that we cannot contract this skin, but by pulling it up, nor pull it up but the hairs will stare a little. It is true that the motion of *fear* doth also contribute thereto, because it makes one *cold*, and that a part of our body cannot be *cold* without being a little more contracted then before.

P R O B. 37.

Whence comes it that many being in a frenzy, have spoke Latin or Greek, without having ever learned either of these languages ?

MAny of those that have examined this Question, endeavouring to rid themselves of the great difficulty which it presents at first to the mind, have in my judgement made use of such answers, as are more against all appearance of reason, then the Question it self, and given us remedies worse then the disease: For they would give such strange force to our imagination, that no man of a sound judgement is able to give credit to their vain discourses. Wherefore omitting all that they have said of it, we will search only amongst known causes, according to our custom, the reason

A Miscellany

on of so marvellous an effect. It then it is remarkable, that few words, which many being in a hurry have pronounced in a tongue which they knew not, have been ordinarily *Latin* or *Greek*, or sometimes *Hebrew*, according to the report of those that have treated of them. In the second place I suppose the words which they have thus spoken, did not make any discourse which was coherent or that was pertinent to that which was asked them, and that the transports of their hurry hindered them from distinguishing rationally. These two things being thus supposed, one may say, that although those that have spoken *Latin*, *Greek*, or *Hebrew* in a hurry, never studied it, and yet they easily may have heard those words before which they spoke, and that these three languages are commonly taught throughout *England*, and that private houses and the places which are set apart for

speaking in publick, do very often retain them. Now it is possible that these words, at the same time when they heard them, made some impression in the organs of their memories, which through its weakness did not appear to them, untill they fell into madness; because that the heat of the frenzy by its immoderate subtilizing of the spirits of the brain, renders the sense of the imagination so quick and so delicate, that there cannot be in its organs any impressions so weak which it discovers not and is lively enough affected with it. And that the images of certain things can lodge in our memories, and we have no knowledge of them at all, because they are only painted very weakly, and as it were with dead colours, may sufficiently be proved by *Reminiscence*, which brings to our minds many things which we thought we had utterly forgotten. Besides many otherlike impressions,

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are also made oftentimes in the other organs of our faculties, and we never perceive it; and it is not to be doubted, for example, but that when the weather is about to change, our bodies, although we perceive nothing on it, do receive within them some change, as well as those of birds that thereby do pre-
sage fair or foul weather. In the *third* place, one may confess that certain images may be imprinted in our organs without being perceived, after the example of a man that is very short-sighted, who doth unquestionless, for all that, receive the images of objects very far distant, because that he would see them if on a suddain, the power which he hath of seeing should become more subtile and quick. And if any man wonders not that these freneticks we speak of, are able to retain, and conserve a long time in their memories the images which they do not know are there, but that the words which they

they heard only by the by, should be able to leave there any light and weak picture of themselves. He must remember that besides that the organs of the memory are without doubt very delicate, and very susceptible of all impressions, the activity of natural things is marvellous, and hath many times much greater extent than we believe. For, for example, could we easily perswade ourselves, that a beast that runs can in running imprint its sent in all the places where it goes, if the dogs of chase did not prove it; and when we have handled a ring of glass, or silver, or gold, would we believe at the first, that so small touching of it should take away any thing from it: and yet Philosophers hold that it must needs be so, since that at length we diminish it sensibly by handling it? I add further that it is not necessary, that the persons we now speak, of should have heard those words they pronounce in their
H frenzy,

nzy, only once; they may have
 ord them two or three several
 ies, and a man must the less won-
 : that we have the images of things
 thout knowing it, when he con-
 ers that our very desires are hid-
 n from us, when they are as yet
 ry feeble, and newly born.

P R O B. 38.

*What is the reason that a too earnest
 entreaty makes us unwilling instead
 of inciting us to grant that which is
 desired of us?*

[S it not because man being a ra-
 tional creature and one that
 ought to act freely, loves to lead
 himself the dance in all his actions,
 and to have the beginning of them
 n himself; and that when one de-
 sires to constrain him with too much
 ardour and violence to any thing,
 he thinks he is rather *drawn* by the

ardour and pressing importunity, then put upon it of *himself*, which consequently displeases him, and makes his will more cold instead of heating it? Or else, is it because he which begs of us earnestly, makes us foresee plainly enough, that we cannot deny him his desire without putting him into a great choler, and making him our enemy, that is to say, that he provides for us his enmity, as it were a punishment in case we fail of compliance toward him, in which our mind sees yet a greater image of constraint, and that which displeaseth it more? for it hates nothing so much, as to seem to do a thing out of fear. Or else, is it because we judge, that he which desires a thing with immoderate and excessive passion, is apt to tell a lie to gain it, sooner then another man that desires it with less violence; and that he doth purposely conceal from us some circumstance, which would make his request unreasonable, and

unjust ? Or else, is it because that which is very violently desired, seems to us of more consequence ; and that in things of consequence, we are wont to demur and consider a good while before we resolve any thing, because we are affraid of committing some great errour ? Or else is it because he which prayes us with too much earnestness, sayes many things which make us believe that he hath his eye fastened only upon his own interest, and that he regards only the good or evil that may happen to him upon our denyal or consent, and not on the good or evil that may befall us, which we dislike with some reason, as being unjust : for, according to equity and reason, he that would have us be disposed to do good to him, ought also on his part to wish us well, and that in desiring of us an act of good will towards him, he have not a will indifferent toward us ? Or else lastly, is it not because too earnest prayers and sup-

plications are commonly accompanied with too low and base a submission, and a too servile flattery, which commonly do quite contrary to that a man thinks they should? It is manifest indeed that a too low and sordid submission is apt to be contemned, and every one knows it well enough; but that which deceives men, is, that oftentimes they do not consider long enough before the consequences of this contempt, and see not that it not only extinguishes *Affection* in us, but also inclines us even to *Hatred*, just as *Pity* inclines us to *Love*. Besides, the submission that any one renders to us, is not more apt to please us, and by this means to get some benefit of us, then to make us think it comes from a base and dejected mind, since that all the advantage we can finde in it, proceeds only from the mind that it comes from: and as for the excessive praises which are given us by him that desires to

obtain some favour from us by his too base flattery, if we think that they do not come from the heart, we consider them only as so many cheats; and if we believe that he doth really esteem us, with that excess as he makes shew of, first, we do not much thank him for it, because the esteem which a man hath of any one, is a thing forced, and depends not on him that gives it; and in the second place, we do not now take so much care to preserve and augment this esteem in him by our benefits, as thinking it both great enough and well enough established, whereas when any one respects us, but with more moderation, we labour what we can to encrease this esteem by our beneficence, and take care to cherish and cultivate (as I may so say) a belief, which we see is both profitable and glorious to us.

P R O B. 39.

What are the causes of the marvelous things which we observe in the Silk-worm?

TO say the truth, there is nothing so admirable as that which no body admires. Those which we call *occult qualities* in the Elements, or in other things, may have the most *common causes*, like Juglers tricks, which seem to be grand mysteries, before one hath discovered them: but *Man*, whose ordinary operations and common motions we do not at all admire, offers us nevertheless in these operations and motions far more worthy subjects of astonishment; his *Passions* are more admirable than the *ebbing and flowing of the sea*; the power of his *understanding* over his *Will*, more marvelous than the influence of the *Stars*;

Stars ; the operations of his *Senses* are of much more difficult explication, then all those of the *Loadstone*; and he is a great *marvail* that admires little ones. Not to go too far in this discourse, the consideration of the marvels which are discovered in the *Silk-worms*, may furnish us with some proofs of it : they seem at first sight to surpass or equal the things that are most strange; and those that have described them, have not been able sufficiently to admire that this creature should be killed by the sole noise of thunder, that it should have an instinct to spin unprofitably, and even with the loss of its life, seeing that it stifles it self in its own work, that it can draw out of its body that *Silk* of which it composes it; that a long time after it is dead, it revives; that it transforms it self into a *Butterfly*, and after it is thus transformed, it can live still many dayes without meat, that is to say, to the end of its life. But how strange soever
all

all these things seem, I conceive that if we would consider them somewhat exactly, we should perswade ourselves, that there is no necessity of leaving the bounds of common and ordinary causes to unvail and clear the secrets of them; and to do it, I will lay down only two things; First, that Silk-worms are excessive cold; and Secondly, that they are full, and as I may so say, overglutted with an excessive moisture: their moisture is apparent of its self to our sight, since that it makes them wholly transparent; and it is credible, that it is this that renders them so fruitful. Their extreame coldness may also be felt by our hands, and doth besides discover it self by certain reasons to our minds, seeing that in the midst of Summer, if the weather come to be a little coldish, they dye with cold, which doth not befall any other creature; and seeing those which take the pains to keep them, are carefull to keep them very warm,

and in a place that is not exposed to the Northwind. These two things being thus supposed, it is no wonder in the first place that the noise of thunder kills them; this manifestly proceeds from the fear which so terrible a noise causes in them; for they must needs be very fearful, since that they are so cold and are void of blood; and when fear adds its coldness to that which is natural to them, so violent an excess may easily deprive them of life. Now as the Silkworm is very cold, and when it begins to grow old, its natural frigidity by this means encreasing, it is not to be wondered at that it seeks to envelop and cover it self, to the end that it may be warm: for all other creatures being pressed with cold, do the like, and search out holes wherein they lie in the straw, and enwrap themselves even in the cloaths and hangings of our houses, so be the less troubled with it. Mereto serves the Silk which it vomits,

mits, and we must not wonder that it can vomit this rich matter; for it is nothing but the remainders of its nourishment which its too weak heat cannot digest, and as it were a superfluous humour which their abundance of it hath caused. Besides, when it puts it forth, it is not dry, but viscous, and hath a clammy moistness: but presently after the air hardens and dries it, as if it were glue. Being thus covered for warmth, it is not stifled as folks believe; nature doth not give creatures any instincts that are so destructive to them. It dies not unless by a *natural* death for want of strength, but rather it makes its *Bed* when we think it builds its *Sepulcher*, and *sleeps* when we believe it *dies*. And indeed, if we open this pretended grave, after that we believe it is dead, we shall clearly perceive that it is only in a profound sleep; its natural frigidity, which even before it thus locked it self up, caused it to sleep

sleep longer then ordinarily other creatures do, making it sleep much longer, since it lockt it self up enveloped as it is in silk, which it wisely drew out of its own body to cast round about it; it grows a little warm by reason that its heat is on all sides hindred from exhaling, and driven back; just as a man becomes warm by means of the cloaths he covers himself with. But whence comes it, you will say; that it transforms it self into a Butterfly? I answer, that there is no colour to say it is *transformed*; that the Wings it acquires were due to it from its birth; that nature intended it should flye with them: but that they could not grow out, untill that being covered with silk, which it vomited, it had gotten together a little more heat, to strengthen its *vegetative* faculty, and enable it to put them forth, as it doth to that of *Trees*, to put forth their fruits, leaves and flowers, the production whereof

was.

was formerly hindered by the coldness of the Winter. Nor doth this happen only to *Silk-worms*; for *Caterpillars* spin the like upon trees, locking themselves up in their own work, and being there, they get wings as well as these. But that which further proves to us, that the heat of the *Silk-worm*, uniting itself, after the manner aforesaid, may serve to put forth its wings, is, that *flying Serpents* are to be seen only in very *hot* Countries, by reason it seems, that the extream heat of the air, supplying the defect of the coldness of their temper, gives their formative faculty power to produce them. But if we must say that they are transformed, and that they change their nature in acquiring wings, because that immediately after their birth they have none, we must for the same reason say, that many other creatures are transformed when they acquire *Teeth, Nails or Horns*, which they had

had not when they were born, and that the very birds are transformed when they get wings, since that when they were hatcht they had none. The Silk-worm therefore is not transformed, but only becomes able to fly somewhat flowlier; and to conclude my story, it is reasonable we should believe, that after it hath slept much, the same cause that awakens other creatures, awakens this also: Then doth wise nature make it vomit forth a thin sharp moisture, which helps it to gnaw that silk, which it was on all sides environed with, and by this means out it comes and continues for many dayes, and even to the end of its life, without eating any thing, wherein consists the last marvel that we are to speak of. But I conceive we may easily guess the cause of it, if we remember, that it hath a very great moisture joyned with a very small heat: for we shall see that this small heat must finde
for

for a long time sufficient aliment
in this great moisture, without
having need to receive any other
and hereupon might be alledged
the strange story of a German
maid, that having a very weak
heart, and a body full of a viscous
and clammy humour, continued
some whole years without eating
or drinking. Now as this temper
of the Silk-worm discovers to us
the cause why it can live so long
without meat : So this entire ab-
stinence, in which it passes a great
part of its life, may be a new con-
firmation to us, that it hath the
same temper which we attribute
to it at first. For though for
certain season it eats abundantly
enough, of which there may be
easily some other particular reason
yet considering its whole life is
gross, it must pass for one of the
soberest creatures. These are then
in my opinion, the causes of what
soever appears marvelous in the

Silk-worm. If any one hath a mind
to think that there are more
range and more occult ones, it
is not my intent, that this dis-
course should hinder him; But
yet I believe that as we often-
times do not see many things be-
cause they are too far distant from
the eyes of our mind, so at other
times we do not see them because
they are too near, and that we
search at the other end of the world
for that which lyes before our
noses, and that the great eager-
ness that our understanding uses
to arrive at their causes, makes it
go much beyond them.

P R O B.

P R O B. 40.

Why are good men often-times subject to a light promptitude of Choler ?

DO they not only seem to be so, because they are more free and open, and so know not how to dissemble the smallest anger, and least discontentments that arise in them; but let them presently appear in their eyes and words: whereas those that are less free, do conceal them what they can possibly? Or else, is it that those that have honest and good minds, are angry for many things that regard not their particular interests? as for example, for the glory of God, and for any thing that respects *Honesty* and *Piety*, so that as these are general things which come every moment into our discourse, ordinary conversation offers them more often occasion to speak with heat

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and emotion, and in some sort
e provoked: whereas a brutish
1, to whom all things are indiffe-
: except his own proper inte-
, can hear without any disturb-
e, all kind of discourse which he
ot the subject of, be they never
trange; which makes him often
ear more sweet and gentle, be-
se his interests being some parti-
r things, and little known to
ers, they scarce ever come to be
matter of a common discourse?
else, may we not give light to
Problem, by that which *Aristotle*
, that Choler is enclined to obey
on, but that it obeyes it too
, and stayes not until the first
arance of Reason hath given
to another more clear and so-
And may it not be said, that if
must needs be, that good minds
naturally have some seeds of a
promptitude to Choler, because
clination readily to obey Rea-
without doubt a good dispo-
sition

sition of mind, and a token of excellence, though by accident there may arise from it vitious actions and other inconveniencies? Or else, may we not add further, that one shall have less reason to wonder, that Good men have many times such a disposition, if it be considered, that there are some kinds of Anger so handsom, that one may maintain they mark out more of Goodness, Tenderneſs, and Love of good, than even motions of Pitty or Goodwill; becauſe in the motions of Affection and Pitty, the ſoul doth meerly deſire to do good; but thoſe of a generous and laudable Anger, are the motions of a ſoul that doth ſo much love good and hate evil, that it troubles it ſelf at it even to fury, and becomes fooliſh for a time? It may indeed be further alledged in favour of this Paradox, that the tenderneſs of nature of any creature appears not ſo much; for example, when it takes care to give
food

food to its little ones, as when full of anger and as it were in a fury, it layes on load with its wings, or horns, or other arms that Nature hath given it, on those that would come too near them. Or else, in conclusion we may say, that there are certain emotions of choler, in which a man hath no intentions to do any hurt to those of whom he complains with sharp words; but rather to incite them to produce their justifications, to be able to find them innocent, or less culpable, and to continue by this means to love them: so that as they do not proceed out of malice, but tenderness, there is no cause to wonder that good men are subject thereunto, and that they shew a good nature, like in this to Lightnings, that appear in Summer evenings, and are oftentimes signs of fair weather, whereas they should seem rather to presage foul.

P R O B. 41.

Whence comes it that they say, The Love of Grand-fathers to their Grand-children, is greater then that of their Fathers ?

IS it not because a man attains through longer cares to have a Grand-child, then to have a Son; and that alwayes that which we acquire through more care, is more dear to us ? Or else, is not a Grand-child dearer, because it hath been a long time desired ? Or else, do we not look upon it as a more rare favour, and such as heaven communicates only to few persons, which makes us love it the more, because generally all rare things have a particular allurements for our minds ? Or else, is not a Grand-child more beloved of his Grand-father then of his Father, because that his Grand-father

father, as being more old, and nigher his death, doth for this reason desire the more to live again in another ? Or else, is it because the love we bear to those that proceed from us, arising from a desire to extend our being successively to many generations, he that by this natural course is more removed, shews to us this design more advanced, and so doth more touch our inclinations ? Or else, is it because the Father loves his Son only for his own sake, but the Grand-father loves him for his own sake and for his Sons sake too, and sees in him the image of himself, and of him whom he hath begotten, and that these two divers considerations do produce in him two divers tenderesses very powerful ? Indeed this reason is very likely : for to go about to object, that the Father hath likewise two divers causes of loving his Son, because he may love him for the Grand-fathers sake, this makes nothing to the purpose ;


since that, as every one knows, the affection which blood inspires, hath much less force in ascending than in descending. But if still another reason must be given of this *Problem*, one may also say, that perhaps the affection of Grand-fathers doth only seem to be greater then that of Fathers, because the Son being in a more particular manner the very blood and substance of the Father; the Father for this reason thinks that to love him very much, is to love himself very much, and that therefore he conceals and keeps in these motions of it, for fear lest they betray too much weakness and self-love : Whereas a Grand-father being not so much touched with this consideration, doth the more give himself over to the violences of his Love, and dares more freely manifest it, as judging the excess thereof less shameful.

PROB. 42.

is it that a rare and eminent Vertue which shines in a Prince, raises greater motions of Love in the lower sort of people, then in others?

It is a thing worthy to be observed, that the vertue of a Prince if it is eminent and rare, seems to move more Love in the lowest sort of people, then in any others. For we see commonly the vulgar people appear most afflicted for the loss of a good and vertuous Prince, even to weep in the streets, and about the fields, with an extreme tenderness, as it were for a great loss, and it is also the lower sort of people that in his life give him with more zeal and benedictions, and labours to glory with a more passionate will,

will, and such as shows that they have more of resentment against those that would do him any wrong. History may furnish us with a thousand strange and admirable examples of this affection of the vulgar people toward a good Prince; but, that I may not enlarge this discourse too much, we will content ourselves to name only some of them. We see in *Sueton*, that after the death of *Germanicus*, a Prince of an eminent virtue, the Commonalty of *Rome* grew almost mad, that neither the Edicts of *Tiberius*, nor the Religion of certain *Festivals*, could stop the immoderate course of its grief, and that many of those which were possessed of this grief, went so far as to demolish the Altars of the gods through despair, to cast the tutelar gods of their houses into the streets, and to expose those children that were born to them on that day, as refusing all Happiness and all occasions of Joy. The good qualities of

I  *Julius*

Julius Caesar produced also the like effects after his death ; for though he had taken from the *Romans* that liberty which they prized so high ; nevertheless after that *Antonie* had awakened by his Oration the memory of his Goodness, Clemency, Valour, and of the number of his Victories , the common people that heard him, were so touched with it, that after they had done honours to him as a god, they ran with lighted fire-brands in their hands to set fire to the *Capitol*, and had almost burnt down the City , to be revenged on those that had newly freed it, and reduced the Common-wealth to its antient form. This very *Caesar* in his life-time was so beloved of his Soldiers, that having failed of their duty, they desired him to decimate them, thereby to expiate their crime and to give himself satisfaction. The like happened also afterwards to his successor *Augustus*, according to the report of *Appian*. And *Alexander*

the Great, leading his *Macedonian* Souldiers, young and old, cross the deserts, for none other design but to come to the bounds of the habitable world, was nevertheless so tenderly beloved of them, for his Vertue, that seeing them mutiny to return into *Macedonia*, and even the punishment of some of them could not stop their commotion, he only sent them word, they might go whether they pleased, and that he would love them no longer, nor account them his, which touched them with so sharp a Repentance, that flocking before his door, they fell a crying with abundance of tears, that he should kill them if they had offended him, as *Quintus Curtius* tells the story. But to begin our search for the Reason, why the Vertue of a Prince excites in the minds of the common people (that are most commonly interested and mercenary) such disinterested and such heroic motions, which seem to be

greater then those that are raised in the rest of men that are better bred : is it not , in the first place , that the common people are not in all regards inferiour in Vertue to the rest of men; and that if they be something less generous and more mercenary , as we have confessed, they are on the other side full of Pitty , and have in very many things more of Shame and Justice? And may we not add , that as the love which *beasts* bear to their *young ones*, surpasses that which *men* bear to their *children*, it may very well be after the same manner that amongst men a good motion may sometimes be more strong where there is less of Reason and Knowledge , because then a man obeyes more blindly the good incitements of Nature ? Or else is it that many times men of a middle rank look upon the Fortune of their Superiours, if not with envy properly so called, yet at least with some evil of heart ; and that those of the lowest

of Problems.

lowest sort are more free from these motions, because the distance between them and those that go them is greater, and therefore are disposed the more to contribute their Vertue with Love and Admiration? Or else, is it that the motion of an heroick and extraordinary Generosity, when they shine in the eyes of all in the person of a Prince, may excite more admiration in the minds of the lowest sort of people, because they perceive themselves less capable of ever rising so high? Or else is it that when a Prince manifests his affection in general to all his subjects, the lowest people think themselves *most* obliged to his goodness, because they consider themselves *least* worthy of it? Or else, is it not that the greatest proof of the goodness of a Prince consists herein, to be favourable to the poorest, which, as being weakest, are most apt to be wronged by the strong, and not to enrich those that are already

too rich, with the substance of the common people, and to do Justice equally to all his subjects, without having regard to the difference of quality, and that it is no wonder if all this doth more please the common sort of people, then persons of *quality*? Or else is it also that the vulgar sort as being less inlightned, and less polished by Learning, are more dazzled by greatness of Birth, and have more veneration from the pomp and glory that attends the fortune of Princes, so that when the lustre of Vertue comes to shine on their eyes, together with this glittering Greatness, it seems so venerable to them, that it hath power over their minds to do any thing? This last truly seems to contribute not a little to their Admiration; but, to conclude, we may see here by the way, that *Machiavel* had no reason to say that the Vertue of a Prince can raise Love and Gratitude in a few persons only, and that all the

rest

rest of men are ingrateful, and incapable of being moved by it; and therefore in his opinion, he should endeavour rather to make himself feared by the rigour of his punishments: This appears, say I, to be false by our Problem, for we have seen that the love of a Princes Vertue shines chiefly in the common people, which makes the greatest part of men, and is able to beget in them most exquisite and admirable motions of affections, because of this mixture with Greatness, which hath a certain Lustre and Beauty, that doth extreamly take with the people. And if I may be permitted to add something upon this consideration, I shall say further, that it is only the baseness of his own mind, that made him imagine that Gratitude, shame of an unworthiness generally confest, or love of a rare merit, should have so little power upon our spirits; for it hath been often seen, that a troop of mutiners

from amongst the very dregs of the people, after they have contemned the fear of punishment, have become calm and appeased on a sudden, meerly by the presence of a man of known vertue, out of reverence which it imprinted in them. There are many crimes which men cease not to commit every day, although they that commit them are every day hanged for it; but on the contrary, there are ingratitude and unworthinesses which are committed but very rarely, although the Laws have not ordained any punishment for those that are guilty of them, because the greatest part of men have conceptions lively enough of the blackness and sordidness of them. The fear of Death and Pain, which, according to *Machiavel*, do never forsake men, is overcome every day in the wars by the hope of a little pay, and the contempt of them is grown common. But of so many thousand men that hazzard themselves.

selves thus, without doubt there would be but a very few, that for a much greater sum would betray a friend, by whom they had been sensibly obliged. But we leave this discourse, before it hath carried us very much beyond our subject, and pass on to another Problem.

PROB. 43.

What is the reason that Shame makes a redness to arise in the face?

AS there are not any motions more pleasant and more worthy to be known, than those of *Shame*; so there are none that seem to produce their effects in us after so obscure a manner, and so difficult to explain. The reason is, that whatever our mind doth most genuinely and after a more natural manner, is alwayes that which it is least aware of. Now the impressions that *Shame* causes

causes in our blood, and upon our faces, is so natural, that Stage-players which laugh and cry, though they are neither sad nor merry, which can make themselves look pale as if they were afraid, and can artificially draw upon their faces the redness of Anger, and easily counterfeit Pitty, Astonishment, or Disdain, cannot for all this by any cunning draw upon their faces the redness of Shame, and the characters which is ought to be accompanied with. Besides, he that cries hath an intention to cry, and he that weeps hath an intention to weep: but most commonly he that blushes hath no intention to blush; and this is the reason that very modest persons blush even at their very blushing, and by endeavouring to hide their Shame, increase and double it. Lastly, that which makes the difficulty of this Problem appear greater, is, that it is certain the redness of Shame proceeds always from some grief and

and pain which the soul is in. Now it is the property of Grief to repress the blood and spirits, and gather them together about the heart, instead of spreading of them in the face, as shame doth. Nevertheless, we will endeavour here to discover the myserie of so handsom a passion : And first we will tell you what some have thought, that the soul sends forth the blood into the face in shame, because it desires to cover it as with a veil; whereto they endeavour to add some weight from experience, which shews us, that those which are surprized with Shame, do naturally hold their hand before their face. Now as I do not absolutely reject this consideration of theirs, yet I do not think it ought to satisfy us so, but that we should search for others : For besides that it is perhaps a pretty *fancy* rather than a *reason*, certain it is, that many times they that are surprized with Shame, do not desire to hide their faces

faces from him that censures them, but on the contrary do earnestly wish that he read therein his repentance and sorrow, and for all this cease not to blush. To search then another cause of this effect, we must in the first place consider, that in all the Passions, the *Soul* imprints the images of its least motions upon the *body*, and there figures out what itresents, and what it suffers by certain dispositions which it gives it, as it were by so many *Emblems* and *Metaphorical pictures*, whether it doth it out of design, or be constrained to it by necessity. Thus, for example, angry people hold up their heads high, and commonly set both their hands on their sides, because holding the head high and taking up more room then before, is a *Metaphorical* expression of the vain elevation of a presumptuous mind, and of the greatness which it falsely attributes to it self: So a man that affirms any thing with much zeal and opinionativeness,

of Problems.

onativeneſſe, commonly bend
fiſts, becauſe this action hath
Analogy and correſpondence
the eſtate in which the ſoul is. If
were unprofitable and endleſſe
think to prove a thing ſo clear
certain, by enumerating all
paſſions; wherefore ſuppoſing
ther true, we ſay (and I think
much colour of Reaſon) that
griefs and ſadneſſes, when the
flies ſome external evil, and
ſiders it as external, it makes the
rits of the outward parts fly to
the inward, becauſe ſuch a mo-
as ſhews that it deſires from all
to enter into its ſelf, thereby to e-
that evil which comes unto it
without, is moſt proper to repr-
to the life the deſire which it
hath, and the condition it is in
on the contrary in the gr-
Shame, becauſe it is touched with
horror and hatred of an evil,
is within it ſelf, and is faſtened
own ſubſtance, ſince it is no

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at its own imperfection, it cannot express this horror and
it, then by violently thrusting
the blood and spirits from
into the outward parts, as if it
banish them from us, since
indeed it is an estate that hath
Analogy with this corporal
h, and that it would if it could,
it self, and go out of its self.
it means to fly from the vice
it finds it is defiled with.
ver *Shame* dilates the spirits
blood, and sheds them upon
more subtilly then any other
, because it proceeds from a
iritual conception; to wit
: conception of a dishonest
and that the more spiritual im-
have also more quick and
ffects. To this effusion of
and spirits, contributes al-
s after another sort, the
which in shame the soul
s self; for seeing that then
most careful to preserve
and

of Problems.

and defend us (as for example Fear and in Affliction) it doth extraordinarily contract and keep within, to strengthen it self more; it may be; on the contrary when it hates, and thinks it self were unworthy of its own cause doth by a natural motion do much of that straining, which the spirits thus united and collected gives them more liberty to spread themselves, and to carry blood along with them. But it contribute nothing at all to the first reason that we give, is not sufficient to clear this Problem though for the most part we do blush, if we do not think our self really in fault: yet sometimes humy makes us blush; and some wonder that it should be so then the soul, one would think not be troubled with any remorse nor with any sense of its own perfection. To this I answer, in truth we cannot have a true re

of faults, which we have not committed; but as he which hath for some time held his eyes fixt upon a deep precipice, into which it is impossible he should fall, yet cannot choose but tremble out of a vain shadow of fear that this image gives him: So he that hath great horreur for some fault which he is falsly accused of, according as he hath his mind bent upon the consideration of the lewdness which is attributed to him, cannot choose, notwithstanding the clear testimony of his own Conscience and of Reason, but be surprized many times with a vain shadow of remorse, which makes a blush mount into his face, ere his soul hath had time to think better on it.

P R O B. 44.

What is the reason that when we blush, it appears especially in the forehead?

IS it not because the fore-head is the *whitest* part of the face, and most free from natural redness, and consequently most apt to make that more lively appear, which shame imprints in it? Or else the blood which shame brings into the face, doth it not appear chiefly in the fore-head, because the skin thereof is extremely *thin* and *delicate*, as one may easily perceive by so many little wrinkles, which Horror, Discontent, Admiration or Anger do make in it, and because it is free from *hair*, which in the other parts of the face may in some sort hinder us for perceiving so well the impressions which come into it from within? Or else,

it.

if the conceit of those that say, that in shame the soul sends the blood into the face to cover it therewith, as with a veil, must take place; may we not say, that it sends it especially into the fore-head, because it is the part most *exposed* to the *view* of of him that censures us: seeing that when we speak to men, we are wont to look them in the fore-head: Or else do not the spirits in spreading themselves, make the blood especially come under the skin of the fore-head, for that it is the *highest* part of the face, and that it is their nature to *ascend* as much as they can, as soon as the soul lets go her hold by which she keeps them in the body?

P R O B.

PROB. 45.

What is the reason that praises make a man blush ?

IS it not because he that is much commended, feels many times that the excess of praises which are given to him, do puff him up whether he will or no with a little pride, and tickle him with a pleasure that dissolves and as it were shakes all his gravity and firmness : So that he blushes not at the praises, but at the weakness he finds in himself and discovers to others ? Truly that which shews that it may be thus, is, that we see those which are most subject to blush when they hear themselves praised, are commonly such persons as have indeed a sincere goodness, but have not a soul really great ; for a great soul is not puffed up nor elevated at the praises it receives, any more

more than the Sea is encreased or heightened by the water of Rivers that run into it. But it may be too all their redness proceeds not from *Shame*, but comes partly from an extream *pleasure* they take to hear themselves praised; for pleasure also diffuses the spirits and gives some colour to the face. Or else that on the one side, an honest and good soul hath not alwayes the courage, generously to reject the false praises that are given it, because it loves glory; but that, on the other side, because of its goodness, it blusheth at the fault it commits in not resisting them, and in taking to it self by this complacence an honour which is not its due. Or else, is it not out of extream *Humility* that a man blushes, in hearing himself praised for that he doth not at all believe that he is master of those perfections which are attributed to him, and that the praises given him, show him what he ought to be, and therefore

fore do only quicken the sense which he hath of his imperfections ? Or else , is it because he that highly commends us, makes every one look on us the more, and doth in a manner draw us out of obscurity by this glory which he procures us, and that then we blush not at our glory, but rather because we apprehend that our faults will appear the more in this great light which it sets us in, and that it doth as well illustrate our blemishes as our perfections , and renders them the more remarkable ? Here possibly some may say to me , if the blushing of shame proceeds only from the sense which we have of our imperfection , as you have established it in another *Problem*, to what purpose is it that our faults are objected to us by others to make us blush, and what is the reason that it contributes thereto ? I answer, that it is because the judgement of others doth alwayes confirm ours, and therefore if we think that another

blames

blames and condemns a fault which we have committed, this belief of his doth more strengthen the opinion which we had of it before, and doth more lively manifest the ugliness of it.

PROB. 46.

What is the reason that a man laughs more at a pleasant jest, or a merry tale, when he himself that tells it, doth not laugh?

IS it not because then he doth not seem to have the design which he hath, I mean, that he seems as if he would tell something serious and of importance, whereas he only tells some trifle, and that our mind takes pleasure in this deceit? But why doth it take more delight in this *deceit*, then it would have done in seeing the naked *truth*? Is it not because in discovering it thus through a

lye, that is transparent and easily penetrable, it still somewhat exerciseth its noblest faculty, the judgement, and gives to it self some proof of its sufficiency and light? Or else is it because a ridiculous thing spoken in a cold and serious tone, *surprizeth* us the more, because we did not expect to see it in this form, and under this appearance, and so it is proper to cause *laughter*, which must arise from a being *surprized*, whereas he that laughs whilest he tells a merry story, doth as it were *threaten* us and give us *warning* before hand, so that he doth not *surprize* us at all? But why must laughter arise from a *surprize*? Is it, as some say, because it proceeds from *Admiration*, which is raised chiefly by a *novelty*? Or else, is it because that which makes us laugh, is alwayes so vain, that if our minds could consider it a little at leisure, it would not find in it any subject of contentment? Or else, do we not laugh, when he that

tells

tells us any merry thing laughs much at it, because he seems to us as if he commended himself; and that otherwise that which he sayes, seems to be less pleasant, and less apt to cause laughter, when we see he helps it forward by beginning to laugh first? Or else lastly, is it because he which tells a merry passage without laughing, appears to have some politeness, and with all gravity of manners: So that as he appears a more honest man, so likewise whatever he saith, hath more of grace in his mouth, and delights us the more, whereas if he laughs too much, he appears only a *Bouffon*, and by this means whatever he saies, though never so good, loses more then half its grace and beauty?

PROB. 47.

Why do we laugh in seeing a thing very ill-favoured, since that which delights the mind, we would think ought to have in it some perfection?

TO escape this difficulty which is not so slight, but that many ancient Philosophers, and Oratours have laboured to little purpose for the clearing of it: may we not say in the first place, that a man doth not laugh at ugly things, when they are wholly and altogether such, since that on the contrary we do then call them horrible, and fly from them as things odious; but that most commonly a man laughs at some trifling and slight grace mixt with their deformity? as for example, it is clear that the habit of a Bonsson though it be deformed, hath

many times I know not what grace that may tickle the imagination; But what is the reason this remnant of grace, and this vain and flight ray of goodness that may be found in some ill-favoured things, makes one laugh more than a thing reasonably well made would do? May it not possibly be because in a thing ill made, the defects that it hath, may by their opposition render in some sort more pleasant, and more grateful to the fancy, that little grace which shines in it? Or else rather, is it not because generally every grace or prettiness that makes one laugh, either in handsome or unhandsome things, should be always vain and flight, and not solid, as we said in the foregoing *Problem*? But why should it be so? Is it not because solid graces chiefly affecting the *Judgement*, and approving themselves to us by our discretion and understanding, do produce a pleasure though greater, yet more sober

and such as hath something of *grace* in it; but a vain and slight grace, affecting especially the *imagination*, and being chiefly liked by our weakness, fills us also with a joy that manifests somewhat of weakness and childishness, and takes from us all gravity, and makes us not able to hold our countenance, which is that we call laughter, and therefore they say it is a sign of folly in those that are much subject to it? Or else do not things that are very ill-favoured delight those that look upon them because they are *rare* as well as things perfect and excellent? Or else is it not that as our soul loves to have its *Ideas* perfect and intirely expressive of their objects, for this reason it is pleased more in considering things very ill done, then moderately well, because these first do perfect and accomplish the *Idea* which it hath of ugliness, and fills up its knowledge to the full every way; whereas those that are moderate

well done can give it only imperfect notions ? Or else do not objects that are very ill done, by giving us an *Idea* of extream imperfection, furnish us with an easie way to draw from thence the image of extream perfection, and to render it more lively in us ; so that they very much instructing our mind, it delights it self to consider them, not for any reason that perswades it that it should do so, but by a natural and blind motion that makes it search in it to perfect its knowledge, and to instruct its self ? Or else, do we not love to see things very ill done, to shew our abilities in condemning them ? But what is the reason we cannot as well show them in praising those that are moderately well done ? Is it not because every body knows at first sight that which is extream, and findes more difficulty in that which is moderate ? Or because, as we said in another *Problem*, it is easier to blame then to commend ?

Or else, do we not delight to express the rules of good, whereof we have all some *Theory*, rather on the subject of an ill made thing, than of one that is well made, because a thing well made contains them in its self, and so seems to suggest them to us, and to leave nothing to our invention, whereas when we express them by blaming a deformed thing, we seem to invent them our selves? It is probable indeed that fools do it for this reason, because they think they cannot manifest their wit better then by detracting and finding fault. Or else, to conclude, is it not in many meerly an odd fantastical and childish humour to like a thing that is deformed, and to consider it with satisfaction; and therefore we see that all fools laugh more heartily at monstrous and extravagant things, and that good and discreet men smiling only at those, do laugh more heartily at things excellent and handsome, as at a bold

and neat reply, at a pretty compendious way by which some one hath brought about his desires, or at some gentleness that shines in his actions, at a gracefull motion of the body, at the fit proportions and correspondence of all the parts of an History, or Fable, at a passion naturally exprest, or some such like thing?

PROB. 48.

What is the reason that Man being inclined to flatter himself, doth nevertheless aggravate his own imperfection above the truth; as for example, in saying there is nothing but folly, and injustice, and ingratitude in the world?

First, it may be said on this subject, that in truth man attains most commonly to a mediocrity of wisdom, seeing there are scarce any that

that have not the use of common sense; and that to speak civilly, he also attains ordinarily to a moderate and common *Virtue*, seeing there are few that become unnatural: but that for all this, when we come to compare this wisdom, and this ordinary virtue of men with a state of *Perfection* much greater, which reason gives us the *Idea* of, we finde ourselves forced to name them *Vice* and *Folly*, just as we call foul linnen black, in comparing it with that which hath been new washed, or with snow, though it be white in it self and in comparison with Ink; for every mean state is an evil in regard of an excellency which is much above it as truly as it is a good, in regard of that which is beneath it. Now our soul is so much the more apt to look upon the good that is in it with disdain, because it finds it is born for a state of perfection much more eminent; and thus though an *Artisan* be to be com-

mended, if he perfectly understand any mechanick art; yet when we judge of a *Prince*, we make no account of such an ability, if he hath no other, because we conceive he is born for much greater things. Secondly, our soul doth often attribute to it self more imperfection then it hath, because the good already gotten slips out of our memory, and doth not ordinarily present it self to our minds, as that which is wanting doth; the reason of it is, because the soul alwayes withdraws its sight from the things about which it hath no more to do, as on the contrary, it fixeth it upon those that give it some occasion of desire and endeavour. In the third place, a man doth not think there is any need of aggravating the good that is in man, and believes rather it would be a thing very hurtful; but on the contrary, he thinks it is very profitable to aggravate his *Vice* and *Folly*, which is also very true, but yet to
some

some certain degrees only; for to give to man too low conceptions of himself, and such as are like him, is an abating of his Courage and quenching of his Emulation. But however hereby, sometimes the imperfection of man seems to us to be greater than it is; for to consider, first, that which regards his *understanding*, oftentimes when we speak of many fools, we say with a serious tone, as if we desired to be believed, and to have it pass for an *Axiome*, that they have no more judgement than beasts; nay in aggravating their folly, we think sometimes that beasts have more: though if we consider it aright and according to the truth of the business, a man that is the most void of wit, gives, at but opening his eyes, and by his first gestures, and by his first looks, tokens of a greater judgement than all beasts put together: There are also Philosophers that have contributed to the making of the generality of men be

so severely condemned; for whether it were, that herein, they alwayes had for their end some profit that might be reaped by it, or that at sometimes they might be put upon it for some other reasons, they have one after another aggravated his folly in such a manner as if they had a minde to take from him even common sense. In this there is too much severity and bitterness; for we should not consider only the *faults* of people, but also the *good* that is in them, and then we shall finde that in many things they have the first notions most quick and most pure, though they know not how to discourse of them exactly, and after a subtle manner: we should not also impute as so many *faults* of their *understanding*, all the *weaknesses* of their *imagination*, and take them in the worst sense that can be; for all things appear bad to him that considers them not with *candor* and *equity*; and he that is resolved never

of Problems.

ver to see any thing but bad, in
short work, by casting himself
an excess of rigour, and tur
away his eyes from that which
laudable in them; but by this
he depraves himself, and not
which he considers after this
ner; the same also happens from
aggravating of mens vice. But
discover yet another cause
makes us thus defame our na
many times beyond the truth, it
further be said, that every one that
to gain something to his own
vantage in vilifying mankind,
the generality of men; for if
hath any perfection; he is not
willing to perswade himself, that
comes to him from what he
particular and proper, then to believe
that it proceeds from what he
in *common* with others; the reason
whereof is, because what he has
particular, is more his own; and
the contrary if he hath any im
fection, he also findes some com

in the displeasure it doth him, by attributing it to the general nature of man, rather than to the fault of his own individual nature: But especially wicked men are put upon a like design by the like motive; for, that they may finde out some excuse, they endeavour to include all others in the same fault, which they themselves are guilty of: they scrape together therefore what ever is most ugly in our life, and make it much worse in expressing it, and in giving ill interpretations of it; and when we hear them thus aggravate much beyond the truth that which is ill in us, we contradict them not, as well because as I told you, that we think it is *profitable* it should be so, as also because it seems to be *humility* to consent to an accusation in which we are comprized; and on the contrary that it is *arrogance* and *presumption* to oppose it. From hence then arise many sayings and expressions, which import that rea-
son.

son can do nothing or very little on the mind of man, that there is nothing but injustice and ingratitude to be seen in the world, and such otherlike things, which are contrary to other sayings that we have at other times, which are as much beyond the truth: for it is not more impossible that heaven should fall, then it is impossible that Justice and Reason should cease to have very much power upon the minds of men, and that they should not suffer themselves to be bent and affected with this same Reason, as their particular interest. Pirates, robbers upon the high-way, poysoners, and the most detestable of men, do not make any exception against this rule; and though Choler be the most wild and savage of all our passions, and though it stir whatsoever is most base and evil in us; yet that which first kindles it is an indignity, which is nothing else but injustice: and therefore Poets that

are

are the Painters of the ordinary motions of the soul; when they bring upon the stage one that talking to himself alone labours to animate himself with a violent rage, they make him insist longer upon reasons drawn from justice or injustice, then upon others drawn from profit; and not without cause; for if a man do only conclude in himself, that it is profitable for him to be angry, there would be nothing more cold then such an inticement, and he would not for this obtain of himself to be angry in good earnest; but if he be perswaded that it is just he should be so, this consideration would without fail put fire into his soul as soon as ever he thinks of it, and will there kindle the flames of choler: Hence it comes that a thief, what want so ever he have of money, will not be angry that a man hath been so careful as not to let him cut his purse; for he cannot see in this any indignity, and he doth absolutely want the

the considerations of justice, which ought to begin the forming of choler in him. And as for the common sayings by which we express the want of gratitude, which we ordinarily see in men, they also do often surpass the truth; for if we consider it well, there is nothing more pressing than a motion of gratitude, and experience shows sufficient examples of it amongst all sorts of men. But to leave this discourse, I will add, that because there are few spirits so miserable, as to endeavour to make themselves more wicked than they are: Man, for that reason, knows not how inaccessible the extremity of vice is, and how impossible it would be for him to dispoile himself of what ever there is good and laudable in his nature, and to go quite contrary to the rules of Reason; and that this makes him sometimes have too ill an opinion of himself, and to pass beyond the bounds of truth in blaming himself.

P R O B. 49.

What is the reason that according to the common saying of the Poets and of Aristotle himself in the second book of his Politicks, Valiant and couragious persons are most subject to love?

IS it not because courage and an inclination to Love have one and the same Original in the Temperament, namely heat of blood, which may be perceived in that the age wherein man is most couragious through the heat of his blood, is that wherein he is most inclined to Love? Or else, is it not because Love is a passion which hath some beauty and nobleness, and that men truly couragious, as they have a more noble soul, so have they also a greater propension to all the Passions that have any ray of nobleness and beauty,
and.

and proceed partly from a good principle ? Indeed we see, that for this reason they are subject to ambition, because ambition hath some mixture of generosity, and of the Love of that which is honest; and to Opinionativeness, because it hath a shadow of constancy; but that on the contrary they are farther then other men from Avarice, Cruelty, and desire of Revenge, because these motions of the soul have not the least footsteps of any nobleness and beauty. Now to shew that Love is a passion which hath some nobleness and something of praise-worthy, we may bring this reason, that (whatsoever some say that would decide this business by fine expressions, and have their jests pass for Oracles) a true Lover doth in some sort love beauty for it self, and not only for the hope of a base and brutish pleasure; for he not only humbles himself before the beloved object, as we humble ourselves before a great man by constraint.

straint, and with repugnance, and to obtain some good of him, but he also takes pleasure in this very act of submission, and the more he humbles himself with innocence and freeness, and without any design, the more this pleasure increases in him, which is an infallible token that he makes this the end of part of his desire: Justly therefore do the Poets call the excess of Love *handsome fooleries*; for though they be *fooleries* in that they choose their objects ill, they have some *Beauty* in that they denote in the soul where they are formed, some violent inclination to love *perfection*. Or else may we say, that even the inclination to love perfection is the sole motive and only fountain of true courage, so that if Love have in it any ray or spark thereof, it is no wonder that those who have an extreme high courage, are the more subject to it? Or else is it that it is an hard matter to resist at once two contrary assaults, because this seems

to.

to require two contrary dispositions of mind; and that for this reason they that have a soul strong to resist griefs and objects of terrour, are many times extraordinary weak against pleasures and objects that conquer by flattering our senses; amongst which those that cause Love are the most alluring? Certainly, it seems credible, when we consider the great weakness with which men, the most famous for their courage, have yielded to pleasures of this kind. Nevertheless, herein their courage was imperfect; for our soul ought not to be firme like *Ice* very hard-frozen, which resisting the blows of hatchets, and bearing heavy burdens, yet makes less resistance to a small heat, and to a ray of the Sun, than the most weak things; but rather like to a *Diamond* which equally resists all assaults: and as a sword cuts alike on both sides, so a perfect and compleat courage should be whetted on both sides, and have as it were two edges.

edges and two points to resist equally *Pleasures* and *Pains* ; Or else, these two different parts of courage, which we now speak of, have not at all any thing of contrary, and do spring rather from the same fountain: but as though the Visual faculty hath one and the same spring, yet when we would collect it into one of the eyes, and there make it become more strong, we do naturally shut the other: so our soul in uniting all its force towards some one side, remits in it other regards, and in avoiding with great care some kind of weakness, it falls more readily into others.

PROB. 50.

Whence comes that aversion to marriage of persons too near ?

AS there is no question but the condemning of Marriage between
 tween

tween persons too near, is less clear by reason, than the condemning of vices, which are formally the motions of malice : so he that would infer from thence, that there is nothing of *nature* in this, and that it is wholly a *Civil* constitution, and no more, will be deceived ; since that the general inclination and opinion of men testifies the contrary ; for a general opinion can never fail of being true, at least in part ; and the example of beasts cannot upon this subject be considerable to a man of judgement ; for it were absurd to think that beasts should respect an affinity which they know not ; and he that should say that laughter, shame, desire of glory, desire of knowledge and the like, are not natural to *Man*, because they are not natural to *beasts*, would evidently make a ridiculous consequence. And if men cannot give particular reasons why they disapprove this sort of marriages, and specify what they

finde inconvenient therein according to reason, we ought to think that for all that they see it in *gross* and at a *distance*, as many times we see afar off an *house*, though we be not able to distinguish the *dores, windows*, and other parts of it. And by how much the less clear the reasons of it are, so much the more reason have we to exercise our selves in the discovery of them in this *Problem*. *First* then I shall say, that not only nature gives us a strong inclination to love those persons which are very near us, and are members of the same family with us, (for of this no man that hath his senses can doubt) but that it also makes us consider them in some manner as we do our selves: This appears in that if a man commends one that is very near us, we blush at it as if he commended us, and do out of humility desire him to forbear, as if these praises were meant to us. This being so, as every one is naturally far from the folly into which

Narcissus fell, and is not capable of being touched with the love of his own beauty : by the same reason he naturally flies from regarding with Passions like to those of Lovers, the persons for whom he hath an affection of the same nature and kind with that which he hath for himself ; and this is a token of the ardour and truth of the Amity which he bears them ; as on the contrary, if this Amity should cease to have the qualities and properties of that which he bears to himself, it were a certain sign that it had received diminution, and is not such as nature requires it should be. In the second place, the reverence which Proximity gives to persons that are of the same family, being an obligation so straight and so natural, that the ancient *Romans* have named it *Piety*, and that every honest soul considers it as a sacred thing ; it proceeds from hence that a man desires to see the degrees of it very distinct, and separate, in several persons.

persons, to the end that it may the more exactly discharge the duties that belong unto it, and discern more clearly after what manner he ought to be affected towards each of them in particular; for he perceives that this knowledge would become much more obscure by marriages that should unite in one and the same person *two* of these degrees first, and afterwards *three* or *four* or more of them; and that in this case there would be requisite much subtilty of wit to discern the obligation that should arise from the mixture of these different or contrary obligations. If besides these general reasons we shall need to alledge others, touching the different degrees of Proximity, first, to shew that reason prohibits marriage with those men or women that are of our nearest kindred to whom we owe respect, I shall alledge those well-known verses, whose truth every one will confess,

*Non bene conveniant nec in unâ sede
morantur*

Majestas & Amor. That is,

*A real Love and Majesty,
Can hardly in one bosom lie.*

Whereupon I add, that if Reason forbids us to use too familiar *caresses* towards those persons I spake of, it doth likewise forbid us to desire to unite our selves to them in such a manner of union as above all others produces Familiarity, and doth necessarily deface and abolish Respect and Inequality: I mean that Union wherein marriage consists. It remains then only to speak of that marriage which may be imagined between *Brother* and *Sister*, in regard of which the preceding reason can have no place, seeing they owe one another no *Respect*, but merely *Amor*. It is well known what a great Personage discoursing on this sub-

ject, hath said, to wit, that the affection which would arise from such a marriage, as being produced from the concourse of two such potent considerations, would be somewhat too ardent. But, for my part, I do not think he should have taken it thus, nay I conceive, that in some sort it ought to have been taken quite contrary. But before I explain my self more clearly, I will say that in every *species* of the Passions, there are of them that are contrary to one another, and that expell one another, and are incompatible, instead of increasing and mutually assisting each other. Thus, for example, there are contrary *Joyes*; for there is a certain *Brutish Joy*, which is so incompatible with another *Spiritual Joy*, that when this last possesses the soul, the other must necessarily give place; and hence it comes to pass that many that feel within themselves most perfect pleasures, and such as are very spiritual, have in their coun-

countenance an ayre of sadness, very far from having their eyes cheerful, and those other marks that accompany lower and baser pleasures. Thus a *sadness* that raises in a man a discourse which he intends to make upon Humane vanities and misery, being very far from encreasing that which the loss of a suit at Law, or the like, hath begotten in him, diminishes it, and instead of overcharging his spirit, comforts it : Thus *Grief* for a *disgrace* far from augmenting the weakness into which our soul is cast through a corporal grief, serves many times to take from her the sense of it. In a word, it were easie to shew, that there are also thus *Angers, Fears, Loves, Enemies*, as I may so say, one to another, and incompatible. This being thus premised, I say, that the Passion which we properly call *Love*, as arising from a *bodily* pleasure, and being altogether *sportful* and *wanton*, and an enemy to all *serious* thoughts

and considerations, according to the saying of Poets and of Lovers themselves, cannot but be of a nature more contrary to *Fraternal Love*, which is altogether *Spiritual, Holy, and Serious*, and flows only from *Reason*. That for this cause so far are they from encreasing one another, it is certain that That must necessarily loosen all the bonds of This, and that as we perceive that it loosens them, and that we have a very great inclination to keep them still fast and united, and such as nature would have them to be, we feel also for this cause a repugnance, by reason of that which thus loosens them. And herein we do for all the world, as if a man should go about to make us laugh heartily, by making some serious and profound contemplation of Philosophie to encrease the pleasure of it; for we should soon perceive that quite contrary these two sorts of Joy cannot agree together, much less augment one another.

another; and that it were an extravagance to think they should. This is all I have to say upon this subject.

PROB. 51.

Whence proceed the excessive heats of the Month of August, and the other effects which are attributed to the Dog-star?

I Have much reason to fear that I shall be accounted rash, if I dare to question the power which is generally granted to the *Dog-star*: but on the other side also, I conceive that if herein I am rash, I ought to be pardoned, in consideration that I undertake by this means to maintain familiar and known causes against recent ones; For as in *Law*, the cause of *Liberty* against *Servitude* is alwayes favourable, I conceive likewise that in disputes of *Philosophie*,

the reasons which are drawn from *known* and *familiar* things, ought to be favoured against all those that consist in *Sympathie*, or in *secret influence*, or in *specifick* qualities, and yet no doubt we ought to have recourse to these last : but it is only as people that are like to be drowned, catch at thorns, and embrace them in that pressing need : that is to say, when we find no other means to deliver our selves from a difficulty : for so long as there is any other means of escaping it, if it be but any thing tolerable, this must needs be very bad. But to come to the present business, Those which have considered that the heat of the Moneth of *August* is greater then that of the Moneths of *June* and *July*, although in them the Sun be nearer to us, and strikes us with less oblique rayes, and makes longer dayes, have thence inferred, that this excess of heat proceeds from the influence of a Star which is called the *Dog*, to which they

they have also given other ill qualities : for this (if we will believe what they say of it) is the cause that in *August* the heat of the Sun is more malignant , even when it is no greater then in the other Moneths of Summer ; that many creatures, and especially Dogs, do then run mad ; and that it is then more dangerous to go into the water ; and that sicknesses are more frequent and greater ; and that men feel some particular weaknesses in all the parts of the body. But all things well considered, it will be found, that there is nothing in all this that should oblige us to attribute secret and particular vertues to the Dog-star, and to leave the large field of known and ordinary causes ; For first I do not see why we should wonder, that the Sun is hotter in *August* then in *July*, though it be true that in *August* he regards us somewhat more obliquely, and that the dayes are shorter ; the reason of

it is, because the Earth having been exceedingly dried by the former heats, is more apt to be violently scorched, as we see that any dry thing set before a lesser fire, receives a more violent heat, then a thing that is moist from a fire that is much greater. That this reason is pertinent, there is an experience that methinks proves it plainly enough; it is, that though at noon the Sun be nearer to us, and cast more direct rayes on us then he doth any time after: yet those that travel in Summer, do perceive a more violent heat two or three hours after-noon, then at noon it self; the reason whereof is, that at noon the moisture of the morning is not so well dried up, either on the grasse, or the air, or the earth, as it is a while after. This example is so put to the subject I apply it to, the Question in hand, that there cannot be found any difference in it, and it may serve well enough to prove what I say, for as somebody hath

hath well observed, the images of the *Four Seasons* of the year, are to be seen in one only Day, in which the *Morning* by its moisture represents the *Spring*: *Noon* and sometime after is like the *Summer Solstice*, and the two Moneths that follow it; the *Evening* to the *Autum*: and the arrival of *Night* to the arrival of *Winter*. Now as this reason renders the heat of *August* greater, it is manifest that withall it renders it necessarily more malign. But yet if it be objected that it is often more malignant then that of other Moneths, without being more violent: I answer, that this doth not yet force us to fly to a secret cause; for if it were necessary to attribute this particular malignity to the influence of some Star, it would follow also, that we must give influences to some other Star, for to render a reason of the particular malignity of the Sun in *March*, which as having a very feeble heat, one would think, should